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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the income tax,1 gifts2 became a means of mini-
mizing tax liabilities. Subsequently, gift giving took on added tax
planning importance when the modern day estate tax was put into ef-
fect.3 Prudent gift giving programs could sharply reduce the amount
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. It is worth noting that attempts to tax income prior to
1913, although ill-fated, were fashioned in such a way that the current income tax
benefits flowing from gifts would also be available, even though gifts were includ-
able in income. See Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 509, 553-60;
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601
(1895) (holding §§ 27-37 of the Revenue Act of 1894 unconstitutional).
2. "Gift" as used in this article refers only to inter vivos transfers and does not en-
compass testamentary gifts.
3. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80. The estate tax be-
came a permanent fixture in the tax structure under the 1916 act and has since
been revamped and refined to its current status. See I.R.C. §§ 2001-2622 (Law.
Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984). Prior to 1916, Congress had utilized a stamp tax on
legacies in 1798 and an inheritance tax that made two short-lived appearances in
1862 and 1898. For a more complete historical treatment of the estate tax, see R.
PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §§ 1.01-.02 (1942); R. PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION 59-78 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL ESTATE];
J. LEsWis, THE ESTATE TAX 655-704 (1979).
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of property subject to the estate tax and thus decrease its burden.4
The gift tax was enacted in an effort to seal this potential escape
hatch.5 Its stated purpose and design was to prevent otherwise non-
taxed gratuitious tranfers from eroding the estate tax base. The ero-
sion would be prevented through taxing the gifts themselves. 6 De-
spite the legislative intent, the gift tax structure gave gifts preferential
treatment over property transferred at death and continued to provide
tax benefits.7 Recent significant changes in both estate and gift taxes,8
together with a reduction in the maximum marginal income tax rate,9
have caused many to speculate whether gifts have lost much, if not
all, of their tax appeal.lo Estate planners must determine the extent
4. For the most part, the estate tax was a levy against property owned or controlled
at death. Gifts made prior to death, not recaptured by some gross estate section,
would not be part of the tax base. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAxFIELD & S. LIND,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 1-1 to 1-3 (1974).
5. The first gift tax was promulgated in 1924 with the express purpose of attempting
to close the "escape hatch." 65 CONG. REc. 3119-20, 8095-96 (1924). See infra note
6. This tax was repealed in 1926. Six years later Congress passed an act which
included a tax gift. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §§ 501-532, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59.
The current gift tax provisions are included in I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (Law. Co-op.
1978 & Supp. 1984). For a history of the gift tax, see generally R. PAUL, supra
note 3, at §§ 15.01-.02; FEDERAL ESTATE supra note 3, at 70-72.
6. See House Comn. on Ways and Means, Revenue Bill of 1932, H.R. Rep. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28; Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Bill of 1932, S. Rep.
No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39. The United States Supreme Court recently stated
that its holding was consistent with "one of the major purposes of the federal gift
tax statute: protection of the estate and income tax. The legislative history of the
gift tax provisions reflects that Congress enacted a tax on gifts to supplement
existing estate and income tax laws." Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086,
1091-92 (1984). See also Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, reh'g denied, 308
U.S. 637 (1939) (gift tax was to prevent avoidance of death tax through inter vivos
gifts). See generally Harris, Legislative History of Federal Estate Taxation, 18
TAXES 531, 536 (1940); R. PAUL, supra note 3, at § 15.04.
7. Primary direct benefits included a gift tax rate schedule that was 25 percent
lower than its estate tax counterpart for transfers or similar value. I.R.C. §§ 2502,
2001 (Supp. II 1954). Also each gift could qualify for an annual exclusion (origi-
nally $3,000, I.R.C. § 2503(b) (Supp. II 1954), and now $10,000, I.R.C. § 2503(b)
(Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984)) and each donor was entitled to a lifetime ex-
emption of $30,000 in taxable gifts. I.R.C. § 2521 (Supp. II 1954), repealed by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(b)(3), 90 Stat. 1520, 1849 [hereinaf-
ter cited as TRA].
8. The Tax Reform Act of 1967 entirely revamped the system. The Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 [hereinafter cited as
ERTA], elevated the credits and created an unlimited maritial deduction.
9. Prior to ERTA, supra note 8, the maximum marginal income tax was 70 percent.
The maximum rate was lowered to 50 percent in an effort to further economic
recovery. I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. II 1954), amended by ERTA, supra note 8, at 176-82.
The purpose of this reduction was to provide equitable across the board tax relief
and to reduce the distortions, disincentives and inefficiencies that resulted from
the higher rates. See S. Rep. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 130.
10. Even before the substantial changes ushered in by ERTA, supra note 8, there was
[Vol. 64:25
1985] TAX POSTURE OF GIFTS
that gifts have been freed from tax bondage. This compels them to
reassess the tax planning role of gifts in general. In order to deter-
mine if gifts are still capable of effecting tax benefits, it is necessary to
analyze the tax status of gifts within the current tax structures. Since
from a pure tax perspective the numbers control, the preliminary
analysis has a strong mathematical flavor. Once the arithmetic is mas-
tered, the role of gifts in the current tax environment can be defined,
and the efficacy of that role evaluated.
II. THE TAXES
A. Income Tax
There is no direct tax benefit conferred by statute to the donor
making a gift." The donee receives the legislative benefit in that gifts
are excludable from the donee's income.12 Gifts13 are essentially re-
ceived tax-free. A heavy emphasis is placed on the term "received."
Although receipt of the gift is not taxable, the donee must account for
any income generated by the gifted property during his ownership.14
Additionally, in all but selected "loss" situations,15 the donee takes a
much concern over the role of gifts in estate planning. See Balmuth, Is it Still
Economical to Make Lifetime Gifts?, 117 TAx & EST. 165 (1978); Brogan, Jr., Will
Lifetime Gifts Survive?, 1977 EST., GIFT & TR. J. No. 3,4 (1977); Officer & Banks,
Estate vs. Gifts in a Period of Inflation, 58 TAxES 68 (1980); Pennefield, Alterna-
tive Methods of Transferring Property - The Demise of Gifts, 36 INST. ON FED.
TAx'N 329 (1978); Pies & Goldberg, Estate Planning: Lifetime Gifts -A Quanti-
tative Approach, 11 TAx ADvisER 83 (1980); Sacher, Lifetime Gifts Will No
Longer Substantially Cut Estate Tax, But Are Still Very Useful, 4 EsT. PLAN. 432
(1977); Shapiro & Brink, Taking Advantage of the Benefits of Lifetime Transfers
Remaining Under the Present Rules, 5 EsT. PLAN. 274 (1978); Solomon, Gifts in
Light of Tax Reform, 12 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 1700 (1978); O'Sullivan, Gifting
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976: What's New? What's Left?, 16 WAsHBURN
L.J. 275 (1977); Wood, Jr. & Todd, Gifts Should Still be Made, But Care is Needed
in Deciding What to Give, When, and to Whom, 6 ET. PLAN. 2 (1979).
11. Gifts are not tax deductible. Moreover unlike some other taxes, any gift tax paid
by the donor is not deductible. I.R.C. § 275(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
Gift tax paid, however, may be added to the donee's basis in the property trans-
ferred. Id. § 1015(d). This "bump" in basis is limited to the amount of the gift tax
attributable to the appreciation of the property during the donor's ownership.
For examples of how the "bump" works, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-5, T.D. 6693,
1963-2 C.B. 326, 328-32, amended by T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544, 544-46; T.D. 7910,
1983-2 C.B. 161, 162.
12. I.R.C. § 102(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
13. Although § 102(a), id., excludes gifts from gross income and § 2501, id., imposes a
tax on gifts, the statute does not defme the term "gift."
14. As with any other property, the owner is charged with the income tax burden.
See J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 17 (Rev. Vol. 1982).
15. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974). In cases where the donor's adjusted basis is
greater than the fair market value of the property at the date of gift, the donee
will take as his basis the fair market value rather than the donor's adjusted basis
for the purpose of determining loss. For situations where the taxpayer takes the
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"carry-over" basis in the gifted property, and upon his taxable disposi-
tion'6 is responsible for all of the appreciation occurring during both
his ownership and that of his donor.17 This effectively limits the origi-
nal exclusion from income to the donor's adjusted basis in the gifted
property alone. Although the carry-over basis rule may dull the luster
of the tax-free receipt, this is partially offset by the donee's ability to
tack the donor's holding period onto his own,' 8 which allows easier
access to potentially favorable capital gains treatment.19 In all, the
statutory framework does little to diminish the joy of receiving.
Although not directly favored, the donor can derive some income
tax relief from his munificence. Two notable benefits are the conse-
quences of the tax treatment adversely affecting donees through the
donee's tax accountability for subsequently earned income and the
carry-over basis rule. The impact of these rules can be compelling
enough to tip the scales in favor of giving gifts.
First, consider that a donor can effectively shift the income of pro-
ductive property away from himself by transferring the property to a
donee-keeping in mind that the donee would usually have a lower
marginal tax rate. Second, disposing of property by gift is not a taxa-
ble event to the donor.20 This allows appreciation to be passed to do-
nees, where, again, it will most probably be subjected to lower tax
rates than that of the donor. It is worth noting that the donor may
pass on the appreciation accrued during his ownership, along with any
property and suffers neither gain nor loss by utilizing either the fair market value
or the donor's adjusted basis, see Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(a)(2)(example)(1956).
16. Of course this is only true if the donee makes a taxable disposition of the prop-
erty. Conceivably, the donee could transfer the property in a manner that would
not trigger a tax accounting, i.e., by gift (but see infra note 20), and thus not bear
the tax cost for any appreciation on the property.
17. If the donor acquired the property with a carry-over basis, the donee who is sell-
ing the property would have to account for all the appreciation on the property
which accrued during his ownership, that of his donor, and that of the donor's
donor.
18. I.R.C. § 1223(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
19. Section 1202(a), id-, permits 60 percent of an individual's net capital gain to be
deducted from gross income. "Net capital gain" is defined in § 1222(11), icl, as the
excess of net long term capital gain over net short term capital loss. For net long
term capital gain see Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1222(3),(4),(7),
98 Stat. 494, 1011 (as amended by § 1001(a)(1) reducing the holding period from
one year to six months) [hereinafter cited as TRA 84]. For net short term capital
gain see id. § 1222(1),(2),(6) (as amended by § 1001(a)(2).
20. See Campell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Com-
missioner, 63 T.C. 778 (1975); Sorelle v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 459 (1954). But see
Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) (where the donor had to recognize
gain to the extent that the donee's payment of the donor's gift tax liability on the
transfer exceeded the donor's adjusted basis in the gifted property). See gener-
ally TRA 84, supra note 19, § 1026 ("grandfathering" pre-March 4, 1981, net gifts
from the adverse income tax exposure. This non-code section rule was recently
applied in Davis v. Commissioner, 84-2 U.S. TAX CAS. (CCH) 1 9877 (1984)).
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he may have acquired with the property.21 Also, since making a gift is
not a taxable disposition, the donor is afforded the opportunity to
divest himself on a tax-free basis of certain assets carrying an ordinary
income "taint. '22
In a negative vein, there is a high non-tax cost which is paid in
order to reap these tax benefits: the donor must completely divest
himself of all interest in the property before any tax rewards can be
obtained. Thus, an overall evaluation of an individual's particular sit-
uation must be made before it can be determined whether making the
gift is justified. The tax consequences of gift-giving are forced to share
center stage with other non-tax considerations 2 3 in the determination
of the appropriate course of action. Although the tax ramifications
should always be considered, as the following examples illustrate,
standing alone they are probably insufficient to justify the decision to
make the gift.
Consider each of the following situations in which the donor is in a
fifty percent marginal income tax bracket; the donee is in a twenty
percent marginal income tax bracket; both the donor and donee are
cash-basis, calendar-year taxpayers; there is no gift tax due on any of
the transfers; all of the gifts are made on the first day of the year; and
any sales of the property are made at the year's end.
Situation I. Donor makes a gift of $5,000 cash to his son.
Situation II. Donor makes a gift of a piece of vacant land worth $20,000 in
which he has a $12,000 adjusted basis to his daughter, who then
sells the property.
Situation III. Donor makes a gift of stock worth $10,000 in which he has a
$4,000 adjusted basis to his brother. The stock pays $1,000 cash
21. See supra note 16.
22. Generally, the disposition, other than a redemption, of § 306 stock will give rise to
ordinary income treatment to the extent of "earnings and profits" at the time of
distribution of the stock itself. I.R.C. § 306(a)-(b) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp.
1984). Section 306(e) specifically exempts gifts of § 306 stock from triggering the
ordinary income accounting. I- § 306(e). The donee does, however, acquire the
"taint." Id § 306(c)(1)(C). For the special rule treating the redemption of § 306
stock as a § 301 distribution, see id. § 306(a)(2).
In addition to § 306 stock, the recapture provisions of § 1245 and § 1250 are not
triggered by the gifts. Id §§ 1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1). However, a gift will cause a
recapture of the investment tax credit. Id. § 47(a)(1).
23. The non-tax reasons for making gifts are as varied as the donors themselves. The
donor may be looking to minimize future estate settlement costs by using joint
tenancy or a trust as the devolutionary device. Perhaps the prime objective is to
avoid having to manage the assets or see a loved one enjoy the use of the property
now. Gifts can also help support an elderly relative or provide a child funds to
purchase a house or seize a business opportunity. And maybe the most important
non-tax reason of all, donors make gifts purely as a way of showing love and
affection for the donees. The reasons cited are not intended to be exhaustive.
They are merely illustrations of the numerous qualitative concerns of the estate
planner.
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dividend at the middle of each year. The brother sells the
stock.
In Situation I, if Donor had retained the money and earned eight
percent interest on it, at the end of the year he would have had $5,200.
This amount is computed as follows: the original $5,000 plus $400 of
interest ($5,000 at eight percent) minus the $200 tax liability ($400 at
fifty percent). By making the gift, Donor avoids the $200 tax liability,
but has parted with $5,000 plus the $200 after-tax interest he would
have earned. In all, he has saved $200 at a cost of $5,200.
In Situation II had Donor retained the land and sold it himself he
would have realized an $8,000 gain. If the asset qualified for favorable
capital gain treatment,24 the net effect would have been a $3,200 in-
crease to his taxable income,25 and a concomitant $1,600 tax liability.
At year's end he would have had $18,400.26 By making the gift, Donor
avoided the $1,600 tax liability, but at a cost of $18,400. If the net capi-
tal gain deduction was not available, then the $8,000 gain would have
generated a $4,000 tax liability.27 This would have resulted in a
$16,000 transfer being made to avoid a $4,000 tax exposure.
In Situation III, retention of the stock would have meant $1,000 in
dividend income plus $2,400 of includable gain from the sale after ap-
plying the net capital gain deduction. This $3,400 of additional income
would have resulted in another $1,700 of tax for Donor. He then
would have had $9,300.28 Instead, by making the gift he has avoided a
$1,700 tax liability at a cost of $9,300 in lost capital. If the net capital
gain deduction was not available, the tax saving escalates to $3,500 and
the lost capital is reduced to only $7,500.29
24. Generally, § 1221 considers all property held by a taxpayer to be a capital asset
except for items specifically excluded by subsections (1) through (5). I.R.C.
§ 1221 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). For purposes of the example, as long as
the land is not inventory, held primarily for sale to customers, or used in a trade
or business by the donee, it will be a capital asset in his hands. Even if the land is
used in a trade or business, it may be treated as a capital asset. See id. § 1231(a).
The taxpayer must have a net capital gain to obtain favorable treatment. See
supra note 19.
25. The $3200 is the result of the recognized gain of $8000 (amount realized of $20,000
in excess of the $12,000 adjusted basis; see I.R.C. § 1001(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 &
Supp. 1984)) minus the § 1202 capital gain deduction of $4800 (48000 - .6).
26. This figure reflects the deduction of the $1600 tax liability from the $20,000 in
proceeds received on the sale of the land.
27. Without the § 1202 deduction the full $8000 gain would be subjected to the 50
percent marginal tax rate and create the $4000 figure.
28. The sale proceeds of $10,000 added to the dividends of $1000 ($11,000 income)
minus the $1700 tax cost equals $9300.
29. Again the § 1202 deduction is instrumental. I.R.C. § 1202 (Law Co-op. 1974 &
Supp. 1984). Without the deduction the taxable gain is the full $6000 ($10,000
amount realized in excess of $4000 adjusted basis; see id § 1001(a)). The donor's
taxable income is $7000 ($6000 plus the $1000 dividend income) which at a margi-
nal tax rate of 50 percent generates a $3500 liability. Since the tax liability would
[Vol. 64:25
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One need not be an astute estate planner nor a sophisticated math-
ematician to conclude that the pure income tax numbers by them-
selves do not justify gift giving. Donors, however, make gifts for a
myriad of reasons and not just to minimize taxes.30 Although the tax
numbers may not justify the gift, tax factors can be added to other
considerations to assist in the overall "give or keep" decision. Once a
donor has decided to make the gift, the tax savings can serve to reduce
the cost of implementing that decision. Viewing the three hypotheti-
cal situations from the donees' perspectives, and comparing them with
the "donor-retention" results, demonstrates the worthiness of tax in-
centives for gift giving.
In Situation I, upon receiving the $5,000, the son incurs no adverse
income tax exposure. 31 The $400 of interest generated that year is, of
course, required to be included in his income. Utilizing the donee's
twenty percent marginal tax bracket, there is an $80 tax liability, and
the donee will have $5,320 of after-tax dollars at year's end. The bot-
tom line shows that a $5,320 benefit (post-tax dollar's on hand) was
conferred upon the son at a net capital cost of $5,200 to the donor. The
$120 difference is absorbed by the unintended "donor" in the transac-
tion-the government. Although, in this instance, the government's
"gift" is relatively small, with higher rates of return and lower donee
tax brackets, better results through increased government participa-
tion can be obtained.
In Situation II, the daughter receives the land tax free and takes a
$12,000 carry-over basis in it.32 Since the land is vacant, there are no
annual earnings to account for. Upon selling the land, the daughter
will realize an $8,000 gain and, assuming she can qualify for the net
capital gain deduction, will essentially include only $3,200 in her taxa-
ble income. 33
At the daughter's marginal tax rate the sale will generate a $640
tax liability, leaving her with $19,360: the $20,000 gross receipt minus
the $640 tax cost. This provides a $19,360 benefit received at a cost of
only $18,400 to the Donor. The government effectively added $960 to
the Donor's gift. If the capital gain deduction were unavailable, she
would be forced to account for the full $8,000. This would result in a
have been $3500, had the donor retained the property, his after tax amount would
be $7500 ($11,000 gross receipts minus the $3500 tax cost).
30. A major aspect of estate planning is devoid of tax considerations and is concerned
principally with the devolution of property. To this end the income tax conse-
quences are of little importance. See supra note 23 for discussion and rationale of
this argument.
31. I.R.C. § 102(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
32. lci §§ 102(a), 1015(a). As previously discussed these two sections are the operat-
ing rules for donees. See supra notes 11-15.
33. As was the case with the donor, the 60 percent § 1202 deduction will reduce the
$8000 gain by $4800 to $3200. See supra note 25.
1985]
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$1,600 tax liability, leaving Donor with only $18,400 after-tax dollars.
In this instance, the government's part of the gift would be increased
to $2,400.34 The government's largesse is becoming impressive.
Not surprisingly, Situation III yields a combination of results ob-
tained in the previous two examples. Again, the brother receives the
value of the stock tax free but takes a $4,000 carry-over basis, and
must report the $1,000 dividend income as his own. Upon disposition
of the stock, a $6,000 gain is realized which will, assuming the availa-
bility of the net capital gains deduction, increase taxable income by
$2,400. The $43,400 of income to the donee will result in a $680 tax
liability, and reduce his after-tax receipt to $10,320 ($11,000 minus
$680). If the net capital gain deduction is not available, the tax liabil-
ity would be $1,400, leaving the brother with $9,600 after taxes. The
comparative results are as expected. With favorable long term capital
gain treatment, the Donor confers a $10,320 benefit at a $9,300 cost to
himself. Without it, the benefit is $9,600 at a cost of $7,500.
The examples clearly demonstrate that, although there are income
tax benefits associated with gift, such benefits are insufficient to be
the sole motivating force to compel a transfer. There can be govern-
ment participation in the gift, which in certain circumstances can be
quite substantial. But even in the best of situations the tax savings
cannot overcome the loss of capital. Moreover, this conclusion is not
altered by the mere fact that assets generating ordinary income pro-
vide greater tax benefits as opposed to net capital gain. Some assets
will produce greater "value received to value relinquished" ratios.
However, the ratio bears primarily on the choice of asset to be given,
and not on the actual decision of whether or not to make the gift.
Despite the inability to generate sufficient tax benefits to justify
making gifts, there is mathematical support which indicates that there
are some tax rewards for donors. In the proper circumstances, donors
can save tax dollars and maximize transferred values at the govern-
ment's expense. Thus, even though recent changes to tax rates have
minimized the rate spread, and consequently reduced the govern-
ment's particpation in the gift, income tax advantages can be obtained
by making gifts.
A simple analysis of the numbers in the illustrations evince that
the donor's only tax saving is on the income element that is trans-
ferred; and then, only at the donor's marginal tax bracket. The gov-
ernment's "gift" equals the income element multiplied by the spread
between the donor's and the donee's marginal tax bracket. When the
34. Even though the daughter has less in her pocket after taxes than she did when
favorable capital gains treatment was available, this is more than offset by the
fact that the donor's capital cost is less. Without the § 1202 deduction, the donor
parted with $16,000; thus, the daughter's $18,400 exceeds the donor's cost by the
$2,400.
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income element represents a relatively small percent of the value of
the gift, large values are transferred with the receipt of only minor tax
benefits and little governmental largesse. Not surprisingly, this some-
times small savings-to-value ratio has prompted a variety of attempts
to shift only the income element without the concomitant loss of own-
ership and control of the property. These assignment of income tech-
niques generally have met with little success.
In Lucas v. Earl,3 5 the grandfather of the assignment of income
cases, Justice Holmes declared that skillfully "devised contracts ...
by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew,"36 would not be recognized for tax purposes. Simi-
larly, in Helvering v. Horst,3 7 the Court stated in essence that the
same theory applied to ownership of property. For tax purposes, an
owner could not "gift" away the income generated by the asset while
retaining ownership of the rest of the property. The issue of how
much dominion and control one could retain and not be taxed on the
income was tested in Helvering v. Clifford.38 The Clifford Court con-
cluded that transferring away beneficial ownership for a short time
span (five years), but retaining substantial control over the property
as trustee, was insufficient to shift the tax consequences away from
the donor-trustee. Subsequently, Congress enacted the grantor-trust
provisions. 39 The primary function of these provisions is to identify
those situations in which tax consequences will be attributed to the
grantor of a trust even though the trust (or its beneficiaries) would
seem to be the appropriate taxpayer(s).40 In setting out the parame-
ters of control which will cause the attribution of income tax conse-
quences to the grantor, a substantial exception was made for the
35. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
36. Id. at 115.
37. 311 U.S. 112, 120 (1940).
38. 309 U.S. 331, 335-36 (1940).
39. With the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress included
§§ 671-78 which are commonly referred to as the grantor trust provisions. In ref-
erence to these provisions, the House of Representatives report explained that
"[t]he effect of this provision is to insure that the taxability of Clifford type trusts
shall be governed solely by this subpart," and that the provisions would follow
the Clifford analysis. House Comm. on Ways and Means, Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A212, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4351-52.
40. I.R.C. Subchapter J §§ 641-83 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984), provides the com-
plex and sometimes arcane rules of trust and trust beneficiary taxation. The ba-
sic rules, however, recognize the trust as a separate entity, with tax consequences
relating to trust transactions accountable by the trust and not the grantor. In the
simple trust setting where all of the trust income is required to be paid out, bene-
ficiaries will probably ultimately bear the full tax consequences. In complex
trusts where accumulations are permitted, the trust itself may well bear the tax
burden. The taxation of trusts is well beyond the scope of this work. For a com-
plete discussion of trust taxation, see J. MERTENS, supra note 14, at § 36.
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"short term" or "Clifford Trust."41 The exception permits the grantor
to retain an otherwise fatal tax reversionary interest in the corpus of a
trust provided that it will not take effect within ten years from the
creation of the trust. 4 2 Thus, a trust providing for a reversion of
corpus ten years and one day from creation will, providing it does not
run afoul of other grantor-trust provisions, permit the income during
that period to be shifted away from the grantor and on to the benefici-
ary. A trust with an interest reverting to the settlor upon the death of
an income beneficiary also avoids grantor-trust treatment, even if the
life expectancy of the income beneficiary is less than ten years.43 It is
worth noting, however, that to the extent these trusts can shift income
tax consequences to beneficiary-donees, the donor must part with do-
minion and control over the property for the operational period in or-
der to obtain any tax benefits.44
Even if one is willing to part with dominion and control, a shifting
of the income cannot always be assured.45 The government will ques-
tion the donors' timing, motives and genuineness of transfer when it
believes income is improperly moving away from the transferor. The
41. I.R.C. § 673 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
42. The code provides that a grantor "shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a
trust in which he has a reversionary interest in either the corpus or the income
therefrom" if the interest begins within 10 years of the transfer of date of that
part of the trust. Id. § 673(a). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.673(a)-i (1960) (reversion-
ary interests).
43. I.R.C. § 673(c) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.673(a)-
1(b) (1960) (discussing § 673(c)).
44. A review of the grantor trust provisions may be helpful at this point. Section 671
provides that the "owner" of a trust account for all of the income tax conse-
quences of the trust. Section 673 explains that a grantor who retains a reversion-
ary interest in the trust is the owner of the trust, but carves out an exception if
such interest will not take effect for at least ten years and one day or until the
death of the income beneficiary. Section 674 explains that the grantor may be
considered the owner of a trust if he (or a nonadverse party. See infra note 59)
has the power to determine who can receive the income from the trust. Section
675 speaks to problems arising when the grantor or nonadverse parties hold
merely administrative powers over the corpus of the trust. Section 676 attributes
the trust's tax consequences to the grantor if he or a non-adverse party can re-
voke the trust. Section 677 provides that the grantor can be the owner of the
trust even if he does not receive its income directly. Finally, § 678 permits owner-
ship to be attributed to a third person who is not the grantor and who may not be
a beneficiary if (1) this third party has the power to obtain trust income for his
own benefit, and (2) the grantor is not considered the owner. See generally B.
BITrKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 80 (1981); J. MER-
TENS, supra note 14, at § 37.
45. See, e.g., Salvatore v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 89 (1970) (addressing the
problem of "ripe" fruit for which taxpayers must take account despite outright
transfers and the independent integrity of such transfers); Rev. Rul. 69-102, 1969-
1 C.B. 32. See generally Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gains and Assignments
of Income, 20 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income; Fruit
and Tree as Irrigation by P.G. Lake, 17 TAX L. REv. 293 (1962).
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recent spate of cases challenging the income deflecting efficacy of
"family estate trusts" is the latest round in the government's effort to
prevent gratuitous transfers from generating unwarranted income tax
benefits.
Although there are variations, the central theme of the "family es-
tate trust" is to have the trust tax account for income putatively
earned by the trust through the grantor's efforts. Then, the trust pays
the grantor's personal living expenses and deducts them from its in-
come. The grantor assigns beneficial interests in the trust to different
family members so that any tax accountability for distributed trust
income can be spread over more than one taxpayer. Theoretically,
such a procedure reduces the grantor's tax liability through the effec-
tive deductibility of otherwise non-deductible items46 and the deflec-
tion of income to close family members.47 However, the government
has attacked the income shifting efficacy of this type of trust on three
theories: anticipatory assignment of income;48 application of grantor-
trust provisions;49 and lack of economic reality, i.e., a sham transac-
tion.5 0 These theories are not mutually exclusive, and the government
freely argues any combination of the three.S1 Revenue Ruling 75-
25752 provides a clear view of the government's approach.
In Revenue Ruling 75-257, the grantor transferred into a "Family
Estate Trust" his personal residence, apartment building, and income
producing securities. The grantor also executed an exclusive "lifetime
services" contract entitling the trust to all future income earned by
him regardless of its source. Despite this contract, the grantor's em-
ployer continued to remit salary to the grantor, who in turn endorsed
the paychecks over to the trust. The grantor received certificates rep-
resenting beneficial ownership of the trust. The grantor, his wife and
a third party were made trustees with broad powers includng the abil-
46. The trust deducts as business expenses under § 162, I.R.C. § 162 (Law. Co-op. 1974
& Supp. 1984), items which § 262 would prohibit the grantor from deducting on
his own return.
47. Generally, by spreading the income among family members one can cause the
income to be taxed in lower marginal tax brackets and, perhaps, through the use
of otherwise unused zero bracket amounts eliminate the tax entirely.
48. See, e.g., Loeffler v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1153 (1983); Belshaw v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1983); Clifton v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 999 (1983).
49. See, e.g., Schultz v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982); Vnuk v. Commis-
sioner, 621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980); Kirst v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1053
(1983).
50. See, e.g., Holman v. United States, 728 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1984); Landsberger v.
Commissioner, 692 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1983); Patsdy v. United States, 84-1 TAX CT.
REP. DEC. (P-H) 9304 (1984); Kelley v. Commissioner 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 380
(1983); Swayze v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1104 (1983).
51. See, e.g., Bensen v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1983); Whitesal v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 474 (1983).
52. Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251.
1985]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ity to deal with trust assets as they deemed fit and to make distribu-
tions to trust employees and themselves as compensation for services
to the trust. The trustees were given total discretion in their actions
and did not require court permission or approval to perform any trust
act. A majority vote of the trustees was all that was needed for any
action to be taken by the trust, except termination required unani-
mous consent. Both the grantor and his wife were deemed to be em-
ployees of the trust and were entitled to compensation for their
services. The grantor and his family were permitted to reside in the
residence transferred in trust as a convenience to the employer-trust.
The trust also paid living costs and provided health care to the em-
ployees and their family.
The ruling took a two-part approach to defeat the trust's attempt to
declare the income and deduct the employees' living expenses. It seg-
regated the employment contract from income producing property
and attacked them separately. As to the former, the ruling cited well
established authority to support the proposition that income cannot be
anticipatorily assigned, even if done irrevocably.53 The "true earner of
income," determined by a factual determination of control over the
earning of the income,5 4 is taxed for its production.55 Based upon the
facts, the ruling brushed aside any notion of the grantor serving as a
mere nominee for the trust with respect to the salary and determined
the real employer-employee relationship to be between the grantor in
his individual capacity and his employer corporation. The trust had no
more than the right to receive salary already earned by the grantor,
and, accordingly, the income belonged to the grantor.56
The ruling dismantled the taxpayer's tax scheme with respect to
the deductibility of the grantor's living expenses through the trust by
taking recourse to the grantor-trust provisons.57 Moreover, applica-
tion of these provisions also works to attribute the income produced
by the properties that were transferred to the trust back to the gran-
tor. The ruling concluded that any one of three grantor-trust provi-
sions, section 674, section 676 or section 677, or a combination thereof,
was applicable and triggered section 671, forcing the grantor to ac-
count for the attributes of the trust with his other individual tax
53. Id. (citing United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973)). See also Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
54. See American Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1971).
55. See Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41, 46 (7th Cir. 1954).
56. The ruling concludes that the assignment of income to the trust is of no conse-
quence. Rev. Ruling 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251 (citing Comer v. Davis, 107 F.2d 355,
358 (5th Cir. 1939)); In re Gorham, 38 B.T.A. 1450, 1455 (1938); Luce v. Burnet, 18
B.T.A. 923, 924 (1930), affd, 55 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1932)).
57. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984) discussed supra note 44. See
also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-678 (1956).
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items.58
The pivotal aspect of the trust that caused it to run afoul of the
grantor-trust provisions was the fact that trustees, other than the
grantor, were non-adverse parties.59 Under section 674(a) a grantor is
the owner of a trust wherein the beneficial employment of the corpus
of income therefrom is under the control of the grantor, or a nonad-
verse party, or both, without the consent or approval of an adverse
party. Since there were no adverse parties under the trust, and a ma-
jority of the trustees (who were the grantor and nonadverse parties)
had unfettered control of the trust, section 674(a) applied. Section
676(a) treats the grantor as owner of a trust when title can be revested
in him by himself, a nonadverse party, or both. Since unanimous con-
sent by the grantor and the nonadverse party trustees could terminate
the trust and revest title to the grantor, Section 676(a) applied. Sec-
tion 677(a) treats the grantor as owner of a trust to the extent that its
income, without the consent of an adverse party, or in the discretion of
the grantor or non-adverse party, or both can be distributed or accu-
mulated for the benefit of the grantor or his spouse. Although the
instrument was silent as to the distributions to any beneficiary, the
ruling concluded that under the inherent authority conferred in the
instrument the trustees had made such distributions by discharging
the grantor's obligations for housing and health care. Therefore, sec-
tion 677 was also applicable. Through any one or combination of these
sections the trust was deemed a grantor trust and its tax attributes
were reportable by the grantor as his own. The income from the prop-
erty was his own,6 0 and all of the living expenses were treated as
though they were made by him and were thus nondeductible.61
58. Rev. Rul. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251, 254. Section 671 specifically provides that the
grantor is considered the owner of any part of the trust to which any of the opera-
tive sections apply. As owner, all of the tax attributes to the trust including in-
come, deductions, and credits are considered to be those of the grantor
individually. I.R.C. § 671 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.671-1, T.D. 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251, T.D. 7741, 1981-1 C.B. 430, 432; § 1.671-2
(1956).
59. Rev. RUl. 75-257, 1975-2 C.B. 251, 253. The definitions of an adverse and nonad-
verse party are found in I.R.C. § 672(a), (b) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). An
adverse party is one with an interest in the trust. Id- § 672(a). On the other hand,
a nonadverse party is simply a person who is not an adverse party. Id- § 672(b).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.672 (the determination of whether a party is or is not an
adverse party is a question of fact, citing Paxson v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 27
(1972)). In this ruling, a third party trustee and the wife, neither of whom had a
beneficial interests, were not adverse parties.
60. Through this analysis it should become apparent that even if the assignment of
income argument failed and the trust was the proper wage earner, all of the in-
come would nonetheless be chargeable to the grantor. I.R.C. §§ 671, 674, 676, 677
(Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
61. Id § 262. A taxpayer cannot deduct his personal living expenses. Of course, to
the extent that any of the expenses qualify under other sections of the code, they
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The courts have been equally hostile to the family estate trust
scheme when used as a device for minimizing tax obligations. In
Wesenberg v. Commissioner,62 one of the first tax court cases con-
fronted with the family estate trust, tax planners were alerted in no
uncertain terms that the trust scheme was persona non grata. The
Wesenberg facts are identical to those of Revenue Ruling 75-257 with
one slight variation.6 3 Although Wesenberg personally executed a
contract with a bona fide employer, the employer agreed to make all
salary payments directly to the trust. Despite the payment arrange-
ment the court held that the assignment of income doctrine con-
trolled. The court noted that the most cogent theory to attribute the
income to the trust would be to say that Wesenberg was a servant or
agent of the trust.64 After reviewing the facts the court concluded
that there was no factual basis upon which the taxpayer could support
such a position. Of particular interest to the court was the fact that
Wesenberg himself, and not the trust, was personally obligated under
the contract to the bona fide employer. This created skepticism as to
whether the trust could ever enforce the contract and require
Wesenberg to perform his duties under its terms.65
Having disposed of the employment contract issue, the court went
on to apply the grantor-trust provisions to attribute all income earned
from the trust property back to the taxpayer.66 Similarly, once section
671 was triggered, all payments made by the trust were related back to
Wesenberg and their deductibility had to stand or fall on their own
merits as expenses made by an individual in a personal capacity.6 7
This of course precluded a deduction for all of the personal expenses
that were not specifically made deductible by statute.68 Also, since the
trust lost its separate tax identity, it was foreclosed from arguing that
the expenses were properly deductible as expenses incurred in a trade
or business, 69 or for the production of income. 70 Moreover, by disre-
would be permissible deductions. For example, mortgage interest could be de-
ductible, id. § 163, as could health care costs to the extend that they exceed the
five percent adjusted gross income threshold. Id § 213(a).
62. 69 T.C. 1005 (1978).
63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1005, 1010 (1978).
65. Id. at 1011.
66. Id. at 1011-14.
67. Id at 1012.
68. See supra note 61. In addition to the previously mentioned permissible deduc-
tions, one could also deduct certain taxes. I.R.C. § 164 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp.
1984).
69. The code permits the deduction for expenses incurred in a trade or business. Id.
§ 162. The § 162 deduction was denied in Annis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1341 (1984), where the taxpayer attempted to deduct the cost of clothing,
cleaning, auto, housing, utilities, job placement, and legal expenses after transfer-
ring property and services to a family estate trust.
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garding the trust for tax purposes, the issue of excludibility of meals
and lodging provided for the convenience of the employer to an em-
ployee was sidestepped.7 1 In all, the end result was a complete disre-
gard of the trust for tax purposes and tax treatment for the settlor as
if the trust had never been established.
Employing the same rationale used by the tax court, the circuit
courts have also soundly repudiated the "family estate trust" as a le-
gitimate means of minimizing or shifting tax obligations.7 2 As further
evidence of disenchantment with the scheme, the courts have denied
taxpayers deductions sought for expenses incurred in setting up the
trusts on the grounds that such costs have not been shown to be any-
thing other than nondeductible personal expenses.7 3 Some taxpayers
have taken a more clever tack in seeking deductions for the set-up
costs. After the determination that the trust scheme has failed, the
settlor contends that he was swindled by the promoter who presented
the family trust concept and took a fee for establishing it, and thus was
entitled to a theft loss. Not surprisingly this theory has also been re-
jected.7 4 Moreover, the judiciary is quite willing to approve negligence
penalties7 5 assessed on these transactions,76 and has issued an injunc-
70. I.R.C. § 212 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See Benningfield v. Commissioner,
81 T.C. 408 (1983).
71. I.R.C. § 119 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). Presumably, a taxpayer would rely
on § 119 as a means for excluding from income expenses paid by the trust for the
grantor's meals and lodging.
72. See, e.g., Holman v. United States, 728 F.2d 462 (1984); O'Donnell v. Commis-
sioner, 726 F.2d 679 (1984) (family trusts have been universally condemned and
found it "incredible" that the taxpayer believed he could distinguish his trust
because payments were funneled through him as an individual, rather than di-
rectly to the trust); Hanson v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982); Vnuk v.
Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980).
73. Gran v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that property held by
the trust was not intended to produce income and § 212(a) would not apply to the
costs of establishing the trust). See also Belshaw v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1062, 1063 (1983) (cost of trust materials not deductible when expended to
retain ownership of property); Contini v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 447 (1981) (de-
duction disallowed since nothing in record indicated trust materials related to tax
preparation or legal assistance in tax matters); Kirst v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1053, 1057 (1983) (materials used to create trust are non-deductible per-
sonal expenditures).
74. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). The Tax Court has rejected
the theft loss argument. See Crowder v. Commissioner, 48 TAx CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) 1359 (1984); Luman v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 846 (1982).
75. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). Section 6653(a)(1) provides for
a penalty equal to five percent of any underpayment of tax due to negligent disre-
gard of the tax rules and regulations.
76. The Tax Court and the Circuit Courts have upheld the negligence penalty in a
number of cases. See Hanson v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir. 1983);
Schultz v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1982); Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621
F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980); Zettner v. Commissioner, 48 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH)
981 (1984); Bennington v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 408 (1983).
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tion against future promotion of the scheme.7 7 The lesson to be
learned is undeniably clear: the "family estate trust" will neither de-
flect income nor pay personal expenses on a tax deductible basis for its
settlor or beneficiaries.
Perhaps an unfortunate sidelight for some "family estate trust"
settlors is the loss of the baby with the bathwater. The tax benefits
available to bona fide donors transferring property beyond their do-
main and control,78 even if in trust, are lost when any of the grantor-
trust provisions apply. When a trust is recognized as having independ-
ent integrity for tax purposes, it must account for income earned by its
property. 79 Therefore, a settlor could fund a trust with income pro-
ducing property and effectively deflect the earned income away from
himself.8 0 But section 671 does not distinguish income that legiti-
mately could be shifted away from that which is anticipatorily as-
signed improperly. The section operates to attribute to the settlor the
tax consequences of all items associated with that part of the trust he
is deemed to own. The price for overreaching is the loss of benefits
which could have been obtained.
Notwithstanding the "family estate trust" debacle, trusts can be
valuable tax planning vehicles. To the extent the grantor-trust provi-
sions can be avoided, significant tax benefits can be achieved. The pro-
tection from section 671 afforded the "Clifford" or "short term" trust
makes it a very popular tax planning device. Common and relatively
simple uses of this type of trust include its use to support non-depen-
dents8 1 or to assist in a low cost accumulation of funds for future use.8 2
77. United States v. Landsberger, 692 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1982).
78. In order to make a valid gift, the donor must, to the best of his ability, relinquish
all rights of ownership. That is, the donor can no longer exercise dominion and
control over the property. See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) ("[I]ncome
that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy at his
own option may be taxed to him as income whether he sees fit to enjoy it or
not."). See also Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1962) (retention and exer-
cise of control over income in family partnership is taxed as income to donors of
partnership interest); Parkhill v. United States, 385 F.Supp. 204 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(continued exercise of incidents of ownership afford ample basis for taxation of
income to the donor of the interest); Stokes v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 415 (1954);
Desks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 674 (1952).
79. See supra note 40.
80. It would seem that if the settlor could shift the income to the beneficiary through
this gratuitous transfer and, in turn, the donee could exclude the receipt because
it was a gift, the income would go untaxed. Such a scenario is too good to be true
and of course is not permissible. Section 102(b) specifically provides that gifts of
income are not covered by the general excludability rule of the section. I.R.C.
§ 102 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1(c) (1956).
81. This is a common method for shifting an elderly relative. The income is paid
directly to the individual who uses it for his or her support. The income is
chargeable to the beneficiary and consequently does not force the grantor to use
his after tax dollars on otherwise non-deductible costs.
82. A college fund can be developed in this way. A greater amount of money can be
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Both objectives can be attained at a reduced tax cost because the trust
income is taxed to the beneficiary, who is presumably in a lower tax
bracket than the settlor. Thus the same amount of value can be pro-
vided to the beneficiary at a lower overall cost.83
The urge to maximize tax benefits has spawned attempts at more
sophisticated uses of the Clifford trust which offer additional advan-
tages to settlors. The "gift and leaseback" technique is one example.8 4
Under such an arrangement, the settlor transfers property used in his
trade or business to the trust, the income beneficiary of which is usu-
ally a close relative in a lower marginal tax bracket. The settlor then
"leases back" the property from the trust. Rental payments on the
lease are deductible by the settlor8 5 and constitute income to the
trust.8 6 The settlor has generated deductible payments that pass to his
intended beneficiary, who will in turn tax account for them with the
benefit of potentially offsetting deductions.87 Despite government op-
position, the technique has received substantial, but not complete, ju-
dicial approval.ss Other attempts for extra benefits have met a
built up by subjecting the fund to the lower tax bracket of the child beneficiary
rather than with the grantor trying to accumulate after tax dollars in his higher
tax bracket.
83. The mathematics are relatively simple. Assume grantor and beneficiary are in 50
percent and 20 percent marginal tax brackets, respectively. If the beneficiary
needs $5,000 for support it would cost the grantor $10,000 in pre-tax dollars to
supply it (in a 50 percent tax bracket it takes two dollars of pretax income to
generate one dollar of after tax wealth). On the other hand, the grantor may
fund a Clifford Trust with just enough property to produce only $7,142 of income
and achieve the same result. The $7,142 of income will generate a $2,142 tax lia-
bility for the beneficiary and leave him with $5,000 after taxes. The use of this
technique reduces the overall tax cost of providing support by $2,858.
84. A gift-leaseback transaction need not employ a Clifford Trust, nor a trust at all.
See, e.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (1951), where the taxpayer made an
outright transfer of the property that was leased back. But see Coombs v. Com-
missioner, 48 TAX Cr. MFim. DEC. (CCH) 534 (1984). (Taxpayer was considered
owner and deuction for lease payments was denied.)
85. I.R.C. § 162 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984) (permitting a deduction for ordinary
business expenses).
86. As owner of the property the trust is properly accountable for the income it gen-
erates. See supra note 14.
87. Since the property is being leased, it can be considered to be "producing income."
The trust could, therefore, qualify for depreciation and other incidental upkeep
deductions.
88. The gift-leaseback technique has, to varying degrees, been accepted by both the
Tax Court and the numerous federal courts of appeals. In Mathews v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973), the Tax Court established the following four criteria for
determining whether or not the rental payments were deductible:
1) The grantor must not retain substantially the same control over the
property that he had before he made the gift.
2) The leaseback should normally be in writing and must require a rea-
sonable rent.
3) The leaseback must have a bona fide business purpose.
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different fate. In two instances8 9 the Tax Court thwarted taxpayers in
their efforts to fund Clifford trusts with promisory notes and deduct
on their personal tax returns the interest paid thereon. The court con-
cluded that because such notes given as gifts were unenforceable
under applicable state law, there was no bona fide debtor-creditor re-
lationship and therefore the interest was not deductible.9 0 Doubt-
lessly this setback will not deter the search for further creative uses of
non-grantor trusts.
4) The grantor must not possess disqualifying "equity" in the property
within the meaning of section 162 (a)(3).
These criteria have consistently been used by the Tax Court. See Wolfe v. Com-
missioner, 48 TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 919 (1984). Matthews v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 12, at 18-20 (1973). However, three years prior to the Mathews decision,
the Ninth Circuit in Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972), devel-
oped its own guidelines consisting of: (a) the duration of the tranfer; (b) the con-
trols retained by the donor; (c) the use of the property for the benefit of donor;
and (d) the independence of the trustee. Id. at 1157. The Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed these criteria in May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1984).
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the gift-leaseback has also been approved by
the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. See Rosenfeld v. Commissioner,
706 F.2d 1277 (2nd Cir. 1983); Quinlivan v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.
1979); Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1950); Skemp v. Commis-
sioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). In Rosenfeld, a case involving the gift-lease-
back of a doctor's office, the court relied on the Mathews criteria and found that
the rental payments were deductible. The court rejected the argument of the
IRS that the whole transaction, and not just the leaseback, must be imbued with a
valid business purpose. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 1277, 1281 (2nd Cir.
1983). The view of the IRS has been accepted by both the Fourth and the Fifth
Circuits. See, e.g., Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'g 61
T.C. 12 (1973); Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975); Van Zandt v.
Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965). These decisions required the whole
transaction to have a business purpose. Peroni, Untangling the Web of Gift-
Leaseback Jurisprudence, 68 MINN. L. REv. 735 (1984). See generally Comment,
Is Trustee Independence a Prerequisite to Deductible Gift-Leaseback Rental Pay-
ments? May v. Commissioner, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 156 (1981); Comment, Gift
Leaseback Transactions: An Unpredictable Tax-Savings Tool, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 569
(1980); Note, Taxation-Grantor Control and its Effect on Gift-Leaseback Deduc-
tions, 15 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 1067 (1981); Note, Use of Gift-Leaseback to Shift In-
come Given Substantial Boost by New Decision, 12 TAx FOR LAW. 128 (1983);
Note, Gifts and Leasebacks: Is Judicial Consensus Impossible?, 49 U. CIN. L. REV.
379 (1980).
89. Swecker v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 552 (1983); Strimling v. Commis-
sioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 211 (1983).
90. Swecker v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 552, 553-54 (1983) (concluding that
since no consideration was given, the donee could not enforce the note against the
donor and thus the payment of interest was gratuitious); Strimling v. Commis-
sioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 212 (1983). See also Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361 (1960); Rev. Rul. 82-94, 1982-1 C.B. 31. This ruling addressed a situation
where parents loaned $50,000 to their son, who then lent the money back to his
parents in exchange for a mortgage note. The son received $8760 per year in
interest (his educational costs amounted to $8000 per year). A § 163(a) interest
deduction was not permitted because a debtor/creditor relationship was not con-
sidered to exist between the parties.
TAX POSTURE OF GIFTS
Gifts are also capable of providing secondary tax benefits. Cash-
strapped donees could use a gift as the source of funds needed to take
full advantage of retirement or employment benefits that they might
otherwise have to forego. A contribution to an Individual Retirement
Arrangement that could not have been afforded without receipt of the
gift not only provides the donee with an immediate tax deduction but
also postpones taxation of any income earned until withdrawals are
made.91 Similar benefits can be had through Keough,9 2 section
401(k),93 and other employer benefit plans.94 Gifts can supply the
means for donee access to other types of benefits. For example, in
Ruch v. Commissioner,9 5 a taxpayer was able to use money gifted to
him by his mother to pay for his medical costs and thereby entitle him
not only to a medical expense deduction,96 but also to a dependency
exemption9 7 and favorable head of household filing status.98
It seems that as long as taxpayers are free to make tax saving ma-
neuvers they will continue to do so in the search for the better "tax
mouse trap." Tax planners must, however, be cognizant of the operat-
ing rules and be prepared to deal with the issue of deciding where
legitimate tax avoidance ends and perhaps illegal tax evasion begins.
Years of wrestling with this problem has not brought a totally satisfac-
tory response, and probably none is forthcoming. Many transactions
will continue to fall into gray areas and in turn force the judiciary to
brighten the boundary lines for successful tax saving transactions.
91. I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
92. Id- § 401. A Keough plan is a retirement plan for the self-employed. For a thor-
ough discussion of these plans, see Zadora, Keough (H.R1O) Plans: Questions and
Answers, 61 MIcH. B.J. 146 (1982).
93. I.R.C. § 401(k) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984) (generally tax favored salary re-
duction plans). The gift could make the otherwise unaffordable salary reduction
financially permissible. See J. MERTENS, supra note 14, at § 25B; B. BirKEN,
supra note 44, at §§ 60.2.3, 61.2.10.
94. Basically any plan wherein the employer makes a matching contribution for that
of the employee will produce the benefit.
95. 718 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1983).
96. The Ruch decision is innovative with regard to § 213 medical expenses. The tax-
payer in Ruch was found to have received a valid inter vivos gift, and it was held
that payment of the donor's medical expenses with the funds of that gift gave rise
to a valid deduction for the donee. Prior case law read § 213 in a very limited
manner, denying the deduction to any taxpayer who received any type of reim-
bursement for the medical expenses. See Litchfield v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d
509 (1st Cir. 1964); Jewell v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 791 (1978); McDermid v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C. 1727 (1970); Hodge v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 186 (1965). See
generally J. MERTENS, supra note 14, at § 31A.07; 4 FEDERAL TAXEs (P-H)
16,380(a), 16,395 (1984).
97. I.R.C. § 151 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
98. Id. § 2(b). Section 2 defines the "head of household" as a person who is not mar-
ried and maintains a household which constitutes the principal place of abode of
the father or mother of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for
such father or mother under § 151. See also J. MERTENS, supra note 14, at § 2.06.
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The fact that the government doggedly scrutinizes taxpayer activities
of this nature is proof in itself that transfers are potential income tax
saving opportunities.
In the main, however, the small savings-to-value ratio is a stum-
bling block, preventing gifts from being justified solely on their in-
come tax merit. But, even if the relative benefits to donors are small,
they nonetheless exist. Moreover, proper attention to the income tax
rules in the gift selection process can identify those asset(s) which will
provide the most tax rewards, thus maximizing the value(s) ulti-
mately received. Viewed in this light any income tax benefit obituary
for gifts seems premature.
B. Transfer Tax99
1. The Taxes Themselves
In contrast to the income tax, the gift tax provisions are aimed di-
rectly at the donor. The primary obligation for paying the tax is on
the donor,100 and the basis for imposing the tax focuses exclusively on
donor transactions. 01 In order to fully appreciate the gift tax and its
implications, it is helpful to have a working knowledge of the estate
tax since the two work hand-in-hand as one unified transfer tax
system.102
In its most rudimentary form the estate tax is the government's
last opportunity to tax an individual's assets. If the income tax is lik-
ened to a charge on putting money into an individual's capital account,
then the transfer taxes can be considered the cost of moving that
money to donees, heirs, and beneficiaries. The estate tax itself is re-
ally little more than a final charge on a decedent's net worth. Viewed
in this framework, the gift tax is a charge upon reducing that net
worth so as to ensure that the collection of the estate tax is not totally
frustrated.
The estate tax is first tentatively computed on a tentative tax base
99. Transfer taxes as used herein refers to I.R.C. chapters 11 and 12, the estate and
gift taxes under the unified credit system brought into being by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. The term does not include I.R.C. chapter 13, the generation skipping
transfer tax. Since its introduction the effective date of this tax has been
postponed. Although presently operative, the tax is clearly an endangered
species and one should not be surprised to learn of its demise before it wrecks
much havoc on estate plans. The tax did, however, survive the Tax Reform Act
of 1984. See TRA 84, supra note 19.
100. I.R.C. § 2502 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
101. kl § 2511. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511.2(a) (1958) (clearly establishing that the tax
can apply to transfers even though the beneficiaries are unknown at the time of
transfer).
102. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2209 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984), also known as chapter 11,
have their own separate identity as the estate tax provisions.
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which includes the decedent's taxable estate10 3 (basically, his net
worth at death) and adjusted taxable gifts.104 The tax rate is then ap-
plied to this base to determine the tentative estate tax, from which are
deducted allowable credits, including the estate tax unified creditos
and any gift taxes payable with respect to gifts included in the tenta-
tive tax base3f06 to arrive at the estate tax liability.107
The gift tax is computed equally as easily. In any given year the
sum of that year's current taxable gifts plus all prior taxable gifts is
subjected to the appropriate rate to compute a tentative gift tax. 0 8
The resulting figure is reduced by any gift taxes previously paid (relat-
ing to the prior taxable gifts included in the gift tax base), and then
again by any available gift tax unified creditL0 9 to arrive at the gift tax
due.1 10
The underlying tenet of the transfer tax system is to have a cumu-
lative tax whereby every taxable transfer, whether inter vivos or tes-
tamentary, is saddled with a tax cost and treated equally. By utilizing
one rate schedule and one unified credit for both the estate gift taxes
the efficacy of the system has been assured. The gift tax computation
is a simple machanism ensuring that each taxable gift is taxed at in-
creasingly higher tax rates. The estate tax computation integrates all
prior taxable gifts into the final tax accounting so that the final gift
(all property passing at death) is also taxed at the highest possible
rate. The theory is sound and for the most part works.
In order to appreciate the practical effect of the transfer tax it is
103. I& § 2051, defining "taxable estate" as the gross estate minus the deductions pro-
vided by §§ 2053-2056 (§ 2053 "expenses, indebtedness, and taxes"; § 2054 "losses";
§ 2055 "tranfers for public, charitable, and religious uses"; § 2056 "bequests, etc.,
to surviving spouse").
104. d at § 2001(b)(1)(B). This section defines "adjusted taxable gifts" as those gifts
made after 1976 which are not included in the donor-decedent's gross estate. To
eliminate any possibility of including the same item in the tax base twice, only
post-1976 taxable gifts that are not included in the donor-decendent's gross estate
are considered adjusted taxable gifts. Id §§ 2035-2038, 2040 (providing the means
for having completed gifts pulled back into the donor-decedent's gross estate).
105. Id. § 2010.
106. Id- § 2001(b)(2) (permitting taxes "payable" and not taxes actually paid with re-
spect to post-1976 gifts to offset the tentative estate tax, thus preventing extra
benefits from arising because of the phase-in of the reduced rates).
107. Having utilized the formula set forth in § 2001(b) to determine the estate tax
base, reference must then be made to § 2001(c) which provides the rate schedules
for taxation. Id § 2001(c). It should be noted that the rate schedule of
§ 2001(c)(1) must be read in conjunction with § 2001(c)(2) which contains the
phtse-in of the 50 percent maximum rate. This phase-in was originally targeted
to will be completed after 1984, id, but it has recently been delayed until 1988.
See TRA 84, supra note 19, § 21.
108. Id § 2501.
109. Id § 2505.
110. Id. § 2501.
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necessary to comprehend the full impact of the unified credit. Origi-
nally targeted at $47,000111 it is presently scheduled to increase to
$192,800 by 1987.112 One must remain mindful of the fact that these
figures represent tax liabilities, and not taxable transfer amounts. It
would take $175,625 of taxable transfers to generate a tax liability
equal to the $47,000 credit.113 Similarly, a $192,800 tax liability repre-
sents $600,000 worth of taxable transfers.1' 4 Regardless of the year of
the phase-in involved, the credit is large enough to eliminate the
transfer taxes as an item of concern for most individuals. But this fact
does not detract from successful operation of the system in its effort to
treat each taxable transfer equally. The following example is illustra-
tive. To simplify matters, all transactions are considered to occur in
1987 and thereafter, although the theory also works during the credit
phase-in period.
Assume in Year One, Donor makes as his initial transfer a $100,000
taxable gift115 to his daughter. This results in a $23,800 tax.116 The as
yet unused unified credit of $192,800 will more than eliminate any po-
tential out of pocket tax payment. In the next year, Donor makes an
additional $600,000 taxable gift to his daughter. This results in a
$206,000 tax"37 which can be reduced by $169,000138 of unused unified
111. The $47,000 figure was established in 1976. See TRA, supra note 7.
112. In 1981, § 2505 was amended, with the $47,000 figure increased to $192,800. The
"phase-in" is to be completed by 1987. I.R.C. § 2505(a), (b), amended by Pub. L.
No. 97-34, §§ 401(b), 442(a)(5), 95 Stat. 172, 299, 321 (1981). Similar adjustments
were made to § 2010 (unified credit against estate tax). Id. § 401(b), 95 Stat. 299
(1981).
113. This can be shown by computing the tax on $175,625. From the rate schedule of
§ 2001(c)(1), I.R.C. § 2001(C)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984), the tax on the
first $150,000 is $38,800, and the excess thereof ($25,625) is taxed at 32 percent, or
$8,200. Thus, the total tax liability equals $47,000 ($38,800 plus $8,200).
114. To calculate the tax on $600,000, the tax on the first $500,000 is $155,800, and the
excess thereof ($100,000) is taxed at 37 percent, or $37,000. The total tax liability
therefore, equals $192,800 ($155,800 plus $37,000).
115. "Taxable gifts" is a term of art defined by § 2503(a) to mean "the total amount of
gifts made during the calendar year, less the deductions provided in subchapter C
(section 2522)." I.R.C. § 2503(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). '"Total gifts"
are computed after taking the annual exclusion into account. Id. § 2503(b).
116. The gift tax on $100,000 is computed as follows:
Current plus Prior Taxable Gifts $100,000
Tentative Tax Thereon 23,800 (A) [§ 2502(a)(1)]
Tentative Tax on Prior Taxable Gifts -0- (B)
Gift Tax Imposed $ 23,800 (A)-(B) [§ 2502(a)(2)]
117. Computed as follows:
Current plus Prior Taxable Gifts $700,000
Tentative Tax Thereon 229,800 [§ 2502(a)(1)]
Tentative Tax on Prior Taxable Gifts 23,800 [§ 2502(a)(2)]
Gift Tax Imposed $206,000
118. The donor is required to reduce his remaining credit by amounts previously al-
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credit leaving a $37,000 current tax payable.
If the donor made no other transfers and died four years later with
a taxable state of $500,000, the tentative estate tax would be
$427,800.119 This figure would be reduced to $390,800 by the $37,000
gift tax already paid, and then again by the $192,800 unified credit.
The resulting $198,000 figure would be the estate tax due nine months
from the decedent's death.120
At first blush it may seem that the donor-decedent received a
double use of the unified credit-first during life to reduce the gift tax,
and then again at death to offset the estate tax. A closer look at the
computation structure shows that this is not the case. Although the
donor-decedent did benefit from the unified credit during life, at his
death he was only able to offset his tentative estate tax liability by the
amount of gift tax actually paid, the $37,000. When computing the es-
tate tax, however, the estate was forced to include aZl taxable gifts in
the tentative estate tax base as adjusted taxable gifts, and not just
those on which a tax was paid. This meant the full $700,000 was in-
cluded in the estate tax base, not just the $100,000 increment that gen-
erated the tax.1 2 Thus, upon death, a tax rate was applied to
$1,200,000 when in fact the decedent's taxable estate was only $500,000.
By throwing adjusted taxable gifts back into the estate tax computa-
tion, these transfers are given the appearance of being taxed twice.
But, by directing that an unreduced unified credit be taken at death,
there is no added cost attached to the gift transaction. A quick run
through the numbers of a decedent dying with an $1,200,000 taxable
estate and no prior taxable transfers will prove the point.
An $1,200,000 taxable estate that is also the tentative estate tax
base generates a $427,800 tentative tax,122 which is also the imposed
estate tax because there is no credit for gift taxes paid. After deduct-
ing the $192,800 unified credit, a $235,000 estate tax payable figure re-
sults. When the donor made taxable gifts, he credited a $37,000 gift
tax and his estate paid a $198,000 estate tax. The two payments to-
gether total $235,000. In both instances, the total transfer tax liability
lowed. I.R.C. § 2505(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). Since the donor started
with $192,800 and used $23,800 in the first year, $169,000 is left. Note that subsec-
tion (d) only permits the credit to be used up to the amount of the tax imposed, so
taxpayers cannot request refunds for unused credit. I& 2505(d).
119. The tentative estate tax is computed as follows:
Taxable Estate $500,000 [§ 2001(b)(1)(A)]
Adjusted Taxable Gifts 700,000 [2001(b)(1)(B)]
Tentative Estate Tax Base $1,200,000
Tentative Estate Tax 427,800 [§ 2001(c)]
120. I.R.C. § 6075(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
121. Since the first $600,000 is shielded by the unified credit it follows that the other
$100,000 taxable transfer created the tax exposure.
122. See supra notes 114-15.
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is identical. By making taxable gifts, the donor did not reduce his tax
liability, but merely pre-paid part of the total amount ultimately due.
Thus, from a strict theoretical perspective, the transfer tax system
works. Whether it be an actual out-of-pocket payment or a forced use
of unified credit,123 every taxable transfer carries with it a tax cost and
thus is treated equally.
For those individuals whose net worths exceed the taxing thresh-
old created by the unified credit, there are escape hatches for minimiz-
ing and even avoiding the tax. Perhaps the two most noteworthy are
the annual exclusion and the marital deduction. Both permit the tax
free movement of wealth and come into play in arriving at the key
term "taxable transfer."124 The value of a gratuitous transfer may be
and often is larger than its taxable portion. This is especially true
with respect to the estate tax as there are usually outstanding liabili-
ties at the time of death which will be permitted to be deducted from
the decedent's aggregate asset values to create his net worth or taxa-
ble estate. 125 To the extent an item is deductible with regard to the
determination of a taxable transfer, it is an escape hatch for passing
wealth without the interference of a transfer tax, and thus can prove
beneficial. In this respect, the annual exclusion and the marital de-
duction are extremely valuable to donors' and decedents' estates.
Recently increased to $10,000 per donee per year,1 26 the annual ex-
clusion will reduce or completely eliminate any tax cost for many
transfers previously within the grasp of the gift tax. The mechanics of
the benefit are quite simple. The first $10,000 of value of a present
interest127 given to an individual in any calendar year is not included
in the computation of total gifts for that year,128 and thus is never part
of a taxable gift or the gift tax base. Moreover, since the exclusion
123. The use of the unified credit to offset gift tax liability is mandatory, thus prohibit-
ing the taxpayer from using or eschewing it as he sees fit to obtain more favorable
overall tax results. Rev. Rul. 79-160, 1979-1 C.B. 313.
124. It may have been noted in the earlier examples that tax rates were applied only
to a "taxable" item, whether it was a taxable gift or a taxable estate.
125. For a definition of "taxable estate," see supra note 103.
126. I.R.C. § 2503(b), amended by ERTA, supra note 8, at 319.
127. The present interest is "[a] unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession or
enjoyment of property or the income from property." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b)
(1983). This is to be contrasted with a future interest which has been defined as
"any interest or estate, whether vested or contingent, limited to commence in
possession or enjoyment at a future date." S. REP. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess.
41 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 496, 526. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-
3(c) (1958) (giving six examples of what would be considered present or future
trust interests). See generally Bittken, The $10,000 Annual Per-Donee Gift Tax
Exclusion, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 447, 451-59 (1983) (providing a comprehensive review
of the future interest/present interest distinction).
128. As previously explained, see supra note 116, I.R.C. § 2503(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 &
Supp. 1984) defines a "taxable gift." The annual exclusion of § 2503(b) is an ex-
clusion "off the top" of any transfer made during the year.
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amount is not part of the taxable gift, it also avoids being pulled into
the estate tax based as an adjusted taxable gift. Values protected by
the annual exclusion forever escape transfer taxation.
The usefulness of the exclusion increases when a donor splits gifts
with his spouse.' 29 With a spouse joining in the split gift, $20,000 per
donee per year can be transferred tax-free. This will amount to an
ultimate $10,000 estate tax saving for the donor whose estate would be
in the fifty percent tax bracket at his death.130 The potential value of
the exclusion is great. For example, with only three years of gift giv-
ing at the $20,000 split gift figure, a $30,000 overall tax saving can be
achieved.131 There is little dispute that the elevated annual exclusion
will make the cost of giving less difficult for the donor to swallow.
Additionally, there are now certain "qualified transfers"132 that can be
totally excluded from the transfer tax base regardless of amount, but
their special nature limits their pure estate planning appeal.
If one is impressed by the benefits flowing from the annual exclu-
sion, then the marital deduction may prove overwhelming. Liberal-
ized in 1976133 and liberated in 1981,134 the marital deduction which is
available for both the gift tax and the estate tax permits interspousal
transfers to escape taxation entirely. As with the annual exclusion,
the marital deduction is used to create taxable transfers,135 so the
transferor never incurs a tax cost for the property transferred.
129. Id § 2513(a)(1). This section permits a gift made by either the husband or the
wife to a third party to be treated for tax purposes as made one half by each
spouse. But it is necessary that both spouses consent to this treatment. Id
§ 2513(a)(2).
130. 1d § 2001(c)(1) contains a rate schedule with a maximum tax rate of 50 percent
for estates in excess of $2,500,000. However, this will not be the maximum tax
rate until 1988. A rate "phase-in" schedule is provided. See § 2001(c)(2), id., as
amended by TRA 84, supra note 19, § 21.
131. The $30,000 figure is the result of $60,000 of value excluded from the tax base
multiplied by the applicable 50 percent tax rate.
132. "Qualified transfers" are defined to include any amount paid on behalf of a per-
son for tuition to an educational institution or for medical care to the provider of
the same. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
133. Prior to TRA, supra note 7, under § 2523 the marital deduction could not exceed
50 percent of the value of the gift. Afterwards, the deduction was permissible on
a dollar-for-dollar basis up to the first $100,000 of value transferred. No deduc-
tion was allowed on the next $100,000 of value transferred, and amounts thereaf-
ter were deductible up to 50 percent of the value transferred. The estate tax
marital deduction was changed from 50 percent of the adjusted estate to the
greater of $250,000 or 50 percent of the adjusted gross estate. TRA, supra note 7,
at § 2009(b)(4)(e).
134. The restrictions of marital deductions were further relaxed by eliminating the
limit of the amount of deduction a taxpayer could claim. See ERTA, supra note 8,
at §§ 403(b)(1), 403(a)(1)(B).
135. "Taxable gifts" as defined in § 2503(a) (Law Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984), equal the
total gifts reduced by certain deductions, one of which is the marital deduction.
Id. § 2523(a).
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Because the marital deduction is unlimited in amount, a qualifying
transfer 36 generates a deduction equal to the value of the transfer
itself. For gift tax purposes, the qualifying property is a deduction
from total gifts to determine taxable gifts; therefore, a transfer could
quality for both the annual exclusion and the marital deduction, and
potentially leave some unused deduction to offset gifts to other do-
nees. 13 7 Unfortunately, that portion of the marital deduction that is
unused because of the annual exclusion is lost and cannot serve to re-
duce other gifts.13s Insofar as the estate tax is concerned, the marital
deduction is used to convert the adjusted gross estate into the taxable
estate1 39 and, as in the case of the gift tax qualifying transfer, is never
considered a taxable item.
The marital deduction now effectively permits spouses to freely
transfer property between themselves without encountering any ad-
verse transfer tax consequences. All such transfers result in a tax
"wash." The magnitude of change ushered in by the new deduction
rules will undoubtedly necessitate a rewriting of the marital tax plan-
ning book.
It requires little imagination to see that gifts can produce transfer
tax savings. Although all tranfers are treated uniformly, only taxable
transfers are taxed. Gifts or portions thereof that do not constitute
taxable gifts can move wealth without it ever being considered part of
the transfer tax base. Moreover, there are additonal tax saving oppor-
tunities available through gift-giving that flow from the structure of
the transfer tax system itself. These opportunities will be explored
more fully in the following section of this Article.
136. The following requirements must be met for property to qualify for the marital
deduction: (1) the donor must have been a citizen or resident of the United States
at time of the gifts; (2) the donee must have been the donor's spouse at the time of
the gift; (3) the interest in property must pass to that spouse; and (4) the interest
must be a non-deductible terminable interest. Id- § 2523(a), (b). Similar rules
apply for the estate tax marital deduction. See id, § 2056(a), (b). See also C.
LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 17.5 (3d
ed. 1974) (listing and discussing the four requirements of property for the marital
deduction). See generally, R. COVEY, THE MARTAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF
FORMULA PROVISIONS (1966) (recommending use of formula provisions to ensure
that requirements are met); J. LEWIS, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION 15-33 (P.L.I.
1984) (ERTA does not change the four requirements qualifying property for the
marital deduction).
137. An example will help to illustrate this point. If husband makes a $100,000 gift to
his wife, the first $10,000 is not considered to be part of the total gift. I.R.C.
§ 2503(b) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). However, for purposes of the marital
deduction, id. at § 2523(a), the amount of the gift is the value of the property
transferred, the full $100,000, and not the $90,000 taxable gift. The husband has a
$100,000 deduction, but a total gift of only $90,000 against which to offset it. Id.
138. Id at § 2524.
139. See supra note 103.
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2. The Transfer Tax Arithmetic
There are four identifiable transfer tax benefits directly associated
with gift-giving. These benefits are attributable to the annual exclu-
sion; the non-taxation of post-transfer income; the non-taxation of
post-transfer appreciation; and the reduction in the tax base resulting
from gift taxes actually paid. Examples can easily illustrate each of
these benefits and its relative worth.
The value of the annual exclusion should be evident from the ear-
lier discussion. Quite simply, the excluded amount can forever escape
taxation. This amount is not considered part of taxable gifts for gift
tax purposes and, consequently, is also excluded from the estate tax
base because only adjusted taxable gifts which, by definition, exceed
the exclusion are included in the computation of the tentative estate
tax.140 The annual exclusion is a pure transfer tax free move. A quick
run through the numbers proves this point.
To simplify this, and all other examples in this part, all transac-
tions should be regarded as having taken place in 1987 and thereafter
with the unified credit at the $192,800 level. This will not distort the
picture because the examples are designed only to demonstrate tax
savings, not actual tax liabilities.
Assume two individuals, A and B, each possess $700,000 worth of
property. In Year one, A makes a $10,000 gift, B does not. A does not
encounter any adverse gift tax consequences because the annual ex-
clusion is equal to the value of the gift. A and B both die in Year two,
neither having made any other transfers. A has a $690,000 estate, B a
$700,000 estate. If there are no deductions available to either estate
these figures will represent the taxable estates and tentative estate
tax bases for each individual, respectively. Remember, A is not re-
quired to add the gift into the tax base as an adjusted tax gift because
the original transfer was not a taxable gift. Consequently, A's tenta-
tive estate tax will be $226,100, which will generate a $33,300 tax liabil-
ity.141 On the other hand, B will have a $229,800 tentative estate tax
and a $37,000 tax liability.142 The $3,700 difference is attributable
solely to the annual exclusion. This figure is the amount by which the
tax base was reduced (the annual exclusion of $10,000) multiplied by
A's marginal transfer tax rate of thirty-seven percent. The benefit, of
course, increases for taxpayers in the higher marginal brackets. When
140. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See also supra notes 104, 108.
141. Computed as follows:
Tentative Estate Tax Base $690,000
Tentative Estate Tax 226,100 (A) [§ 2001(c)]
Gift Taxes Payable -0- (B) [§ 2503(b)]
Unified Credit 192,800 (C) [§ 2010]
$ 33,300 (A) - (B+C)
142. Computed by:
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the fifty percent maximum transfer tax rate is in place,143 the annual
exclusion will be worth up to $5,000 in tax savings for each qualifying
transfer. Moreover, since the exclusion is allocated annually to indi-
vidual donees, an aggressive gift program can go a long way toward
minimizing, if not entirely eliminating, the transfer taxes.
It is almost axiomatic that there is a transfer tax savings on post-
transfer earnings generated by a gift. To the extent a donee owns the
gifted property, he also owns all the income it generates. Since the
income is removed from the donor's wealth, it it not property owned
by the donor at his death; thus, it is not part of his taxable estate,144
nor is it a part of the original gift that comprises the adjusted taxable
gift component of the estate tax base. The benefit can prove to be
quite valuable depending upon the amount of income generated, a
function of both economic yield and the donor's life span after the gift,
and the donor-decedent's estate tax bracket.
Consider the following example in which C and D each own
$700,000 of non-productive assets. C gifts away $10,000 of property
which the donee invests in ten percent interest yielding certificate of
deposit. D invests $10,000 of his own property in a similar investment.
Both C and D live five full years after these transactions. The compar-
ative results are as follows. Assuming no deductions are available, C
will have a taxable estate and tentative estate tax base of $690,000, and
the estate tax thereon will, as before, be $33,300. D on the other hand
will have an estate of $705,000. (The original $700,000 plus five years
of $1,000 of interest from the certificate of deposit.) Again, assuming
no deductions are available, the tax liability will be $38,850.145 The
$5,550 difference is solely attributable to the gift. From the previous
example it is known that $3,700 of this amount is attributable to the
annual exclusion. Thus, the $1,850 balance is a tax savings flowing
Tentative Estate Tax
Base $700,000
Tentative Estate Tax 229,800 [§ 2001(c)]
Gift Taxes Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010]
Estate Tax Payable $ 37,000
143. See supra note 130.
144. "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent
of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of death." I.R.C. § 2033 (Law.
Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
145. Computed as follows:
Tentative Estate Tax Base $705,000
Tentative Estate Tax 231,650 [§ 2001(c)]
Gift Taxes Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
Estate Tax Payable $ 38,850
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from the post-transfer earnings. 14 6
Perhaps the best known incentive for making gifts is the benefit
obtained from moving post-transfer appreciation entirely out of the
donor's transfer tax accounting. It is similar to the post-transfer earn-
ings benefit, but there is a different reason for the saving. The key to
tax savings on post-transfer appreciation is the valuation of the two
components of the estate tax base. All items eventually comprising
the taxable estate component are valued as of the decedent's date of
death47 or the alternate valuation date. 148 Regardless of which date
applies, all assets are valued at death or relatively soon thereafter.
Conversely, the items pulled into the estate tax base through the ad-
justed taxable gifts route are included at their date of gift values.149
Thus, to the extent an item enters the final tax calculus as an adjusted
taxable gift, any change in its value between the date of gift and date
of death is ignored. If the gifted property declines in value an overall
loss will ensue, but if the asset appreciates, the gains are veritably lim-
itless. Recourse to an example will be made to illustrate this point.
Assume E and F each own $700,000 worth of property. E gives
away $10,000 which the donee invests in X Company stock. F buys
$10,000 worth of X Company stock for himself. X Company triples in
value before E and F die. Again assuming no deductions are available
to either estate, the tax consequences are as follows. E's estate will
owe $33,000 in estate tax. F's estate will have a tentative estate tax
base of $720,000 (the original $700,000 plus $20,000 appreciation on the
stock), and a concomitant tax liability of $44,400.150 The total tax sav-
ing affected by the gift is $11,100. As in the previous examples, part of
the difference results from the annual exclusion benefit, amounting to
146. The same result can be obtained by multiplying the $5,000 additional interest by
the applicable tax rate of 37 percent ($5000 .37 = $1850).
147. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
148. Id- § 2032. This section permits the executor to value the gross estate at its value
no later than six months after the death of the decedent. Congress recently ad-
ded subsection (c) to § 2032 which limits the use of alternate valuation to those
instances where both the value of the gross estate and the amount of the tax
imposed after credits are reduced by the election. See TRA 84, supra note 19,
§ 1023. Valuation of certain special use property is provided for in § 2032. The
availability of these alternate valuation provisions do not detract from the tax
savings enunciated in the text.
149. Adjusted taxable gifts are just that. The value of the gifts does not change with
the death of the decedent. Id § 2001.
150. Computed as follows:
E F
Tentative Estate Tax Base $690,000 $720,000
Tentative Estate Tax 226,100 237,200 [§ 2001(c)(1)]*
Gift Taxes Payable -0- -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
*The result of $155,800 plus 37 percent of the amount over $500,000.
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$3,700. Thus the $7,400 balance is the direct result of the shifted ap-
preciation. The total benefit in the instant case is quite substantial
and actually exceeds the original cost of the gift.151 Although this will
not always be the case, it is suggested that certain assets, if gifted away
early enough in the donor's lifetime, can easily produce comparable
results. But even without the assistance of hindsight, it is clear that
the benefit associated with the elimination of post-transfer apprecia-
tion from the tax base has immense potential for the astute donor.
The last benefit, the tax savings on gift taxes paid, is the most sub-
tle, but not necessarily of the smallest value. Since the transfer taxes
are imposed on the accumulation of wealth, it stands to reason that
any transaction that reduces one's wealth also reduces one's transfer
tax liability. Gifts are the major exception to this rule in that they
reduce wealth but are themselves subject to the tax. The payment of
one's own liabilities, however, is a wealth reducing transaction that is
not treated as a gift.152 Thus, to the extent a donor makes gifts and
incurs a gift tax, the payment of that tax reduces this wealth, leaving
less to be taxed at his death, but is not itself taxed as a transfer.
Although somewhat confusing in the abstract, the next example dem-
onstrates that the benefit is a logical consequence of the system.
Assume G and H each have assets of $2,000,000. G makes a gift of a
future interest worth $700,000 and pays a $37,000 gift tax on the trans-
fer.1 53 A few years later both G and H die. Assuming no estate tax
151. Although the $11,100 saved exceeds the $10,000 that was transferred, without the
transfer the donor/decedent would have had an estate valued at $720,000 rather
than $690,000, reflecting the appreciation of the gifted property. Thus, the gift of
$10,000 may still be seen as being only $10,000, but $20,000 viewed as from the
donor's perspective as lost appreciation.
152. Gifts are transfers for less than adequate consideration of money or money's
worth. To the extent a transfer is made in payment of bona fide debt or in the
ordinary course of business no gift results. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). In-
terestingly, since the gift tax itself is considered to be an obligation of the donor,
see I.R.C. § 2502(c) (1982), its payment by the donee constitutes a reduction of the
value of the gift by the donor. See Rev. Rul. 75-72, 1975-1 C.B. 310. This in turn
creates potential income tax problems for the donor who is deemed to have sold a
portion of the property for the gift tax paid by the donee. See Diedrich v. Com-
missioner, 457 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1982).
153. Computed as follows:
Current and Prior Taxable Gifts $700,000*
Tentative Tax Thereon 229,800** [§ 2502(9)(1)]
Gift Tax Paid on Prior Taxable Gifts -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2505(9)]
Gift Tax Payable $ 37,000*
*Since the gift is not of a present interest, the annual exclusion is
inapplicable and the full value of the transfer is part of the tax base.
I.R.C. § 2503(b) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
**Utilizing § 2001(c) rate schedule to reach the amount through $155,800
plus 37 percent over $500,000.
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deductions will be available, H's tax liability will be $588,000.154 G's
adjusted taxable gifts will be $700,000, but his taxable estate will be
only $1,263,500, ($1,300,000 left after the gift minus the $37,000 gift tax
that was paid). His tentative estate tax base will be $1,963,000 which
will generate a $534,350 estate tax payable.155 Thus, G's total transfer
taxes were $571,350. This is $16,650 less than H paid, yet the two indi-
viduals owned and transferred the same amount the wealth. Since
there was no annual exclusion utilized and no post-transfer income or
appreciation to account for, the difference can be attributed to only
one source: the gift taxes paid during life that reduced the overall
amount of property actually subjected to ihe tax rates.156 The donor
must make substantial gifts to be subjected to the higher end of the
rate schedule and obtain the savings associated with this benefit, none-
theless, it is there awaiting the tax conscious donor.
The transfer tax benefits obtainable through gift giving are not re-
ceived without risks. For example, it does not require a strong grasp
of mathematics to appreciate that the effort to avoid tax on post-trans-
fer appreciation may go for naught if the property given actually de-
clines in value from the date of gift to the date of the estate tax
valuation. Instead of achieving a savings, in such an instance the gift
could generate an unnecessary expense. Also, improvident gift giving
can create untoward results because of the phasing-in of an increas-
ingly larger unified credit. Although the examples presumed the
$192,800 credit, in actuality, because of the phase-in, it is possible that
a gift made today could generate a gift tax payable; yet, if the donor
had retained the property, he could have eventually transferred it tax-
free. This could occur, for example, if the gift plus all of the donor's
other assets exceeded the taxable transfer equivalent of the unified
credit for the year of the gift, but the credit available at death should
have shielded the value of the gift plus all of the donor's other assets.
154. Computed as follows:
Tentative Estate Tax Base $2,000,000
Tentative Estate Tax 780,800 [§ 2001(c)(1)]
Gift Taxes Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
Estate Tax Payable $ 588,000
155. Computed as follows:
Tentative Estate Tax Base $1,963,000
Tentative Estate Tax 764,150 [§ 2001(c)(1)]
Gift Taxes Payable 37,000 [§ 2012(a)]
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
Estate Tax Payable $ 534,350
156. The savings can be calculated by multiplying the gift tax paid ($37,000) by the
rate at which that amount would have been taxed had it remained a part of the
estate (45 percent).
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These and similar problems are often the offspring of the vagaries of
asset value fluctuation and, short of possessing prescience in the mar-
ket place, such fluctuations can never be completely overcome. Cur-
rent and projected valuation of assets is an important part of estate
planning, and should not be overlooked. There are, however, other
more serious traps awaiting the unwary donor which can easily frus-
trate otherwise prudent gift-giving programs. The main culprits are
the estate tax sections.
Some of the benefits associated with gift giving are a consequence
of the fact that gifts are made part of the estate tax base as adjusted
taxable gifts. This treatment permits all post-transfer growth to avoid
inclusion in the estate tax base. But, adjusted tax gifts are only those
gifts not otherwise included in the donor-decedent's gross estate.
Some gifts can be pulled into the gross estate,1 5 7 which is the starting
point for determining the taxable estate component of the tentative
estate tax base. Such transfers are then treated like any other gross
estate asset and are valued at the date of death, or alternate valuation
date. Not only is all post-transfer appreciation taken into account
when this happens, but there is no decrease in the amount includable
for the annual exclusion. Thus, two chief gift giving incentives are
lost.
A third detriment is the donor's loss of the use of the tax money.
The gift taxes are not considered a pre-payment of the estate tax.
Consequently, donors do not receive interest for paying part of the
overall transfer tax cost earlier than may otherwise have been neces-
sary. Although this is a hidden cost of any transfer that generates a
gift tax liability, it is particularly onerous when none of the benefits
normally associated with the giving of gifts are present. Specific gifts
that are susceptible to these risks include transfers over which the
donor-decedent retained a "life" interest, certain transfers made
within three years of death, and gratuitiously created joint tenancies.
There are other transfers of equal vulnerability, but they are not usu-
ally made for the purpose of achieving tax benefits.15 8
Generally, any transfer over which the donor retains a statutory
life interest,159 will be included in the donor-decedent's gross estate.
157. The value of the gross estate is the total value of all property at the time of death.
I.R.C. § 2031(a) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984). This value is comprised of the
interests described in §§ 2033-2044. Treas. Reg. § 20.203.1(a), T.D. 6684, 1963-2
C.B. 413.
158. One example is the transfer taking effect at the death of decedent, or a reversion-
ary interest embraced by § 2037. I.R.C. § 2037 (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
While it is conceivable that such a transfer may have been made for the purpose
of achieving certain tax benefits, it is unlikely.
159. Section 2036 identifies three measuring periods: (1) the transferor's life, (2) any
period not ascertainable without reference to the transferor's death, and (3) any
period which does not in fact end before the transferor's death. I.R.C. § 2036
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Again, the includable amount is calculated under the estate tax valua-
tion rules which effectively require all post-transfer appreciation to be
subject to the transfer tax accounting. The adverse tax exposure can
be the unwanted result of innocent agreements or understandings160
between the deceased donor and donee(s) irrespective of the parties'
intention.'16 Moreover, a retained life interest can arise from a tacit
understanding between the parties and need not be legally enforcea-
ble.162 The crucial test is whether the donor-decedent arranged to re-
tain the use of or economic benefit from the transferred property. 63
Sometimes the obtrusive interest is obvious, and knowingly re-
tained by the donor. A grantor may retain the right to income because
of economic need or a desire to continue to exert control over the
property. In such instances the purpose of the transfer is not to mini-
mize the tax, but rests in a non-tax motive, perhaps that of establish-
ing a trust to ensure that assets avoid probate.' 6 4 Regardless of the
reason, the end result is always the same. The post-transfer apprecia-
(Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a); T.D. 6501, 1960-2 C.B.
271. See generally C. LOWNDEs, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, supra note 136, at
§§ 174-97 (legislative history and analysis of § 2036).
160. See Estate of Garner v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 903 (1982) (value of farm-
land transferred to another was included in the estate of decedent because of an
implied understanding that he could retain possession and enjoyment of the prop-
erty for a period that did not end prior to his death); Estate of Hendry v. Commis-
sioner, 62 T.C. 861 (1974) (value of farm transferred twenty years prior to death
includable because of no change in relationship to thd property); Estate or Ker-
dolff v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 643 (1972) (value of a residence includable in gross
estate because of implied agreement for continued possession). See also Rev. Rul.
79-109, 1079-1 C.B. 297 (value of retained use of vacation rental property trans-
ferred by decedent to children includable in the gross estate); Rev. Rul. 70-155,
1970-1 C.B. 189 (value of residence included in gross estate because of agreement
for continued occupation). But see Estate of Subblefield v. Commissioner, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 342 (1981) (valued of farm transferred to children not includable in
gross estate although the decedent continued to live on property and raise crops);
Diehl v. Commissioner, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 12,506 (W.D. Tenn. 1967)
(value of residence conveyed to son not includable in gross estate although father
continued to live there).
161. See Kokes v. United States, 21 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 147,213 (D. Neb. 1968) (value of
five farms transfered by deed includable in decedent's estate although there was
no evidence that decedent had a right to use property or to receive its economic
benefits); Estate of Sullivan v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), rev'd 175 F.2d
657 (9th Cir. 1949) (savings account in two names includable in gross estate of
decedent); Estate of Fry v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 503 (1947) (value of gift mort-
gage certificates included in estate, evidence did not rebut presumption that gift
was in contemplation of death). See also supra note 160 (additional cases).
162. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States 361 F.2d 662, 666 (6th Cir. 1966).
163. For an excellent discussion of the "retention" issue, see R. STEPHENS, G. MAX-
FIELD & S.LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, 1 4.08(4)-(6) (5th ed.
1983).
164. It must be remembered that estate planning is not solely concerned with taxes.
Finding an appropriate and easy means of devolving property is of equal
importance.
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tion benefit is lost. Also, transfers with a retained life estate acceler-
ate the potential overall out-of-pocket transfer tax cost. Of course to
the extent that the transfer itself generates an immediate gift tax lia-
bility, the donor is deprived of the use of that tax money, although
some corresponding transfer tax benefit may ultimately
materialize.1 65
Whereas the tax detriments of a retained life interest can usually
be avoided with proper planning, the same cannot always be said for
certain transfers made too close to the donor's death. The progeny of
a stormy history,G66 the current treatment of transfers made within
three years of death is relatively inoffensive. Outright gifts are no
longer pulled back into the gross estate unless the gift is a life insur-
ance policy,167 or the release of otherwise taxable powers.168 The as-
sociated value is added to the tax base only once, even though some
transfers may be includable in the gross estate under the authority of
more than one provision. Nonetheless, once a transfer is made part of
the tentative estate tax base, the chief tax benefits associated with
having made the gift vanish. In addition, any potential benefit flowing
165. One of the benefits of giving gifts is the reduction of the estate tax base by gift
taxes paid on previous transfers. See supra text accompanying notes 151-56.
166. Section 2035 deals with the tax treatment accorded to inter vivos gifts made close
to the donor's death. In its original form the section created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that transfers made within two years of death would be considered in
"contemplation of death." Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 756.
This proved to be unworkable and Congress reconstructed this part of the statute
so that there was an irrebutable presumption that the transfer of property with-
out consideration, having a value of over $5,000 and within two years of death was
in contemplation of death. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 9. This
revision had limited success, however, because of Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312
(1932). In Heiner, the court found that a conclusive presumption, like the one
contained in the Revenue Act of 1926, violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. In response to Heiner, Congress again changed course and went
back to a rebuttable presumption. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 401, 48 Stat.
680. In 1950, the rebuttable presumption period was increased from two to three
years. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906. The 1950 act also added a test
which called for a review of the "bodily and mental condition to the decedent and
all other attendant facts and circumstances." Id. The purpose of this new test
was to determine if, in fact, the gifts were being made in contemplation of death.
This change prompted many courts to permit property to avoid estate taxation if
at least one important motive for giving the gift was present. See, e.g., Estate of
Sprague v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 794 (1974). In 1976, TRA, supra note
7, created automatic inclusion in the gross of estate for all taxable gifts made
within three years of death. However, this provision was again altered in 1981
when Congress for the most part eliminated the includability of almost all out-
right transfers made within three years of death. See ERTA, supra note 8, at 312.
The gift tax paid on all transfers made within three years of death is pulled back
into the gross estate irrespective of the tax treatment accorded the gift itself.
I.R.C. § 2035(c) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
167. I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
168. Id,
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from the fact that gift taxes have already been paid is lost because of
the "gross up" rule.169
The "gross up" rule was designed to ensure that the effect of the
since repealed automatic inclusion of all gifts within three years of
death was not undermined.170 Congress recognized that shrinkage of
the tax base by the amount of gift tax paid on substantial "death bed"
transfers could effect sizable transfer tax savings. The rule simply re-
quires that all gift taxes paid on gifts made within three years of death
be added back into the gross estate. Thus donors are discouraged from
pursuing aggressive last minute gift programs in order to obtain large
and perhaps undeserved tax breaks. When the automatic inclusion
rule for gifts within three years of death was eliminated,17' there was
no corresponding repeal of the gross-up rule. The rule is still in effect.
Moreover, its application is not limited to gifts which are eventually
pulled into the gross estate, but pertains to all gifts made within three
years of death. Thus, all of the tax benefits attributable to gift giving
are not always available. Taken objectively, however, the gross-up
rule itself should not be considered a deterrent to gift giving. Conced-
edly, it minimizes the overall tax savings, but it does not outweigh the
other incentives which are still available, even if the donor dies within
three years of making the gift.
The final and perhaps most perplexing trap for unwary donors con-
cerns gifts in joint tenancy between the donor and others. To properly
analyze the current state of affairs in this area it is necessary to distin-
guish spousal from non-spousal joint tenancies. Exclusively inter-
spousal joint tenancies no longer generate immediate transfer tax
problems, but non-marital tenancies still do.
The gratuitious creation of a joint tenancy is considered a gift of
the donee's moiety for gift tax purposes,172 unless it involves a bank
account 173 or government savings bondl74 in which case no gift is rec-
ognized until the donee realizes an actual benefit. The gift tax marital
deduction 7 S does come into play so that no taxable gift,176 and conse-
quently no tax exposure results when the donee is the donor's spouse.
169. Id. § 2035(c).
170. The congressional intent was to eliminate, as much as possible, any tax incentives
that "death bed" gifts would provide for the taxpayer. See H.R. Rep. No. 1380,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 13-14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3356, 3367-8. See also M. WINBERGER, ESTATE AND GiFT TAX AFTER TAX REFORM
32-33 (1977).
171. I.R.C. § 2035(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984) makes the automatic inclu-
sion rule inapplicable for decedent's dying after 1981.
172. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1983).
173. Id. § 2511-1(h)(4).
174. Id.
175. I.R.C. § 2523 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
176. The marital deduction is used to convert "total gifts" into "taxable gifts." Id.
§ 2503a.
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Upon the death of either spouse, the fractional interest rule17 7 forces
the decedent to include the value of only his (or her) moiety in the
gross estate. But, the estate tax marital deductionL7 8 will work to pre-
vent the value of the moiety from increasing the taxable estate. The
joint tenancy and marital deduction rules operate in unison to ensure
that the gratuitous creation of marital joint tenancies do not produce
any adverse transfer tax consequences. 179
Joint tenancies not exclusively between spouses can create transfer
tax problems. 8 0 Since the creation of the tenancy estate is a gift, the
usual transfer tax consequences are encountered. Whether or not a
tax will actually have to be paid will depend upon the size of the gift,
the donor's prior taxable gifts, and the remaining available unified
credit. Unlike the estate tax treatment accorded other gifts, the full
value of the joint tenancy property is presumed to be includible in the
donor-decedent's gross estate.18 ' The executor can exclude from the
gross estate that percent of the value of the property which can be
shown to be attributable to the surviving tenant's consideration or
contribution. 8 2 Thus, joint tenancy provides a donor with all of the
177. Id. § 2040(b)(1). See infra note 180.
178. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
179. Too much joint tenancy between spouses can undermine attempts to maximize
the use of two unified credits and cause needless tax exposure. See infra note
232.
180. The fractional interest rule applies to "qualified joint interests": tenancies exclu-
sively between spouses. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
181. The general rule is that:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of the interests therein held as joint tenants with right of
survivorship by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the
entirety by the decedent and spouse, or deposited, with any person carry-
ing on the banking business, in their joint names and payable either or to
the survivor, except such part thereof as may be shown to have origi-
nally belonged to such other person and never to have been received or
acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth: Provided, that where
such property or any part thereof, or part of the consideration with
which such property was acquired, is shown to have been at any time
acquired by such other person from the decedent for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth, there shall be
excepted only such part of the value of such property as is proportionate
to the consideration furnished by such other person: Provided further,
that where any property has been acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
inheritance, as a tenancy by the entirety by the decedent and spouse,
then to the extent of one-half of the value thereof, or, where so acquired
by the decedent and any other person as joint tenants with right of survi-
vorship and their interests are not otherwise specified or fixed by law,
then to the extent of the value of a fractional part to be determined by
dividing the value of the property by the number of joint tenants with
right of survivorship.
Id § 2040(a).
182. A close reading of § 2040(a) indicates that the surviving tenant must prove an
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drawbacks of gift giving without guaranteeing any of the benefits.
The easy and cost-effective manner with which title to joint interest
passess should not cloud the estate planner's judgment to the point
that the tax disincentives are overlooked.
Along with the direct dollar savings that can be effected, gifts can
also provide indirect, but not necessarily less valuable, transfer tax
benefits. Certain relief provisions relating to the income and the es-
tate taxes are available only to qualifying estates. The potential bene-
fits are impressive. Section 303 provides access to favorable capital
gains treatment for qualifying stock redemptions 8 3 which can, in
some instances, effectively eliminate sixty percent of the taxable gain
from income taxation. Section 6166 permits the estate tax payment
attributable to qualifying business interests to be deferred for five
years, and then payable in installments subject to a low interest rate
on a portion thereof.L 8 4 The special use valuation of Section 2032A is
of particular interest to farmers who can avoid the "highest and best
use" test for valuing qualifying property.
All three of these sections offer potentially large benefits, and all
have stringent qualification requirements. Non-qualifying property
sitting in a gross estate can easily deny access to these benefits.
Through planned gift giving a donor could reduce the amount of non-
qualifying property and pave the way for successful election of any
these sections, and obtain the advantageous tax treatment they pro-
vide. Interestingly, all transfers made within three years of death will
be pulled back into a hypothetical gross estate used for the purpose of
computing whether or not the estate qualifies for these benefits.185
In contrast to their limited impact with respect to the income tax,
gifts can produce significant transfer tax savings. This is not totally
unexpected given the nature of the transfer tax versus that of the in-
come tax, and the way gifts provide benefits in these respective tax
structures.1 8 6 The important point worth emphasizing is that gifts
independent source of funds, because money supplied to the survivor by the de-
ceased tenant will not count as contribution for the survivor.
183. Id- § 303. This section permits the redemption of stock from a decedent's estate to
be considered a sale rather than a § 301(a) distribution. Sale or exchange recogni-
tion allows any gain to qualify for capital gain treatment instead of being consid-
ered as ordinary income pursuant to normal redemption rules. Moreover,
application of § 1014 will eliminate most, if not all, of the gain attendant a sale.
See Barnett & Rhrine, Estate and Gift Taxation After the '81 Act. Estate Plan-
ning Is Not Dead, 12 TAX ADVISOR 718, 722-23 (1981).
184. I.R.C. § 6166 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See Kahn, Closely Held Stocks-
Deferral and Financing of Estate Tax Costs Through Sections 303 and 6166, 35
TAx LAw. 639 (1982). See also Barnett & Rhrine, supra note 183.
185. LR.C. § 2035(d)(3) (Law Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
186. Not surprisingly, after comparing the income versus transfer tax benefits of gift
giving, those associated with the latter surfaced as a greater motivational force to
donors. This fact is primarily attributable to the distinct natures of the taxes
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continue to provide these benefits despite the recent legislative sur-
gery performed on the transfer taxes. In the face of escalating credit
amounts there remains both direct and indirect benefits sufficient to
induce gift giving. Granted, higher credits may reduce the number of
transfer tax motivated donors; but once the credit thresholds are sur-
passed, gifts are left as the only meaningful method for tax reduction.
Each particular situation must be individually examined to determine
the prospective donor's ability and desire to make gifts. But it is wel-
come knowledge that the tax benefits will still effectively reduce the
ultimate cost of implementing the decision. On balance, from a tax
perspective, it appears that the potential tax savings in themselves re-
main sufficient justification for making gifts.
III. EXTRA INGREDIENTS
A. Formal Substantive Concerns
It is imperative that the gift be properly structured or in correct
form. Failure to do so can either defeat any tax savings or minimize
the available rewards. For example, any gift over which the donor
retains a statutory life interest will cause the gift to be included in his
gross estate.18 7 Thus, even though the gift caused a transfer tax ac-
counting when made, major benefits normally associated with gift giv-
involved. When discussing gifts in the income tax setting, the recurring theme
was that the cost of the loss of the property was not justified by the tax savings
alone. Since the income tax requires an annual accounting, any benefits associ-
ated with the giving of gifts are only measured in one given year. Although this
approach seems short-sighted, it should be clear that any savings in subsequent
years can never exceed 50 percent of the after-tax amount the donor would have
had if no gift were made. Thus, despite its perennial nature, the income tax bene-
fits will never exceed the cost of lost capital. These results occur because it is not
the gift itself that provides the donor the tax benefit, but the earnings on the gift.
The donor could accomplish the same tax end by investing the property to be
given away in non-productive or exempt-income producing assets. Consequently,
for purposes of the income tax, gifts do more to avoid tax detriments than they do
to provide direct tax benefits. Conversely, the gift in the transfer tax environ-
ment achieves the tax saving from a more positive approach. Even though there
may be annual reporting, the true transfer tax accounting is done on a cumula-
tive, not an annual, basis. Today's transfer will effect subsequent gifts and ulti-
mately the final disposition of property at death. By making the gift, the actual
overall tax reduction can be accomplished.
This reduction could not be otained any way. The structure of the transfer tax
is such that inaction serves only to delay the day of reckoning. Unlike the case of
the income tax, there are no investments that can ripen into transfer tax free
assets. For these reasons the two taxes are distinguishable in evaluating the cost
effectiveness of giving gifts.
187. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (Law Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984) defines a retained life interest as
the right, possession, or enjoyment of income, or the ability to designate the same
for the transferor's life, any period not ascertainable without his to death or any
period which does not in fact end before his death.
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ing will be lost.18 8 Creating a joint interest by gift can cause similar
unwanted results. Establishing the joint estate can be considered a
gift,' 8 9 but the full value of the tenancy property attributable to the
donor-decedent tenant's gift is nonetheless included in his gross es-
tate.190 Again, significant gift giving benefits are lost.191 However, if
the tenancy is exclusively between spouses, any gift element is ex-
cused from tranfer tax liability and some tax advantage may be had.192
In a more positive vein, a simple outright transfer, when properly
structured, can have significant impact beyond the apparent benefits.
By coupling an immediate gift with a series of delayed gifts a donor
can accomplish much more than he might have thought possible. For
instance, if the objective is to transfer a substantial property value, the
donor could make an outright gift of a percent of the property equal to
the annual exclusion (or double that amount if gift splitting is avail-
able) and "sell" the remainder of the property to the donee. The do-
nee "pays" for the balance by executing a note. Each payment on the
note is subsequently foregiven by the donor as it becomes due. Each
installment will be a gift in the year it is forgiven.193 From the trans-
fer tax perspective, the entire value of the note may be given away
without the assessment of a gift tax through the felicitous use of an-
nual exclusions.
Manipulating the timing of transfers is a proven method of elimi-
nating gift tax exposure despite the government's objection.-94 To en-
188. Once the transfer is pulled back into the gross estate all post transfer apprecia-
tion comes with it. Id § 2031(a). Also, any post-transfer income that remains
within the statutory proscription is made part of the gross estate thereby elimi-
nating another benefit. See United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966). Sec-
tion 2036 transfers may or may not involve initial gifts of present interests and,
depending upon the facts, the annual exclusion and its potential benefit will
never be lost or never come into play.
189. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(5) (1958) (Law Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
190. I.R.C. § 2040(a) requires inclusion in the decedent's gross estate the full value of
joint tenancy property for which the decedent supplied the consideration. See
supra notes 181-82.
191. Not only is the post-transfer appreciation benefit eliminated, but so too is that for
the annual exclusion. However, any post-transfer income that is earned and seg-
regated from the joint estate by the donee-tenant will avoid estate inclusion and
still provide some benefit.
192. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(1) will force only one-half of the value of a qualified joint interest
(defined in I.R.C. § 2040(b)(c) (1982)) to be included in the decedent's gross es-
tate. Thus, all of the benefits of gift giving are to some extent available. Of
course, the marital deduction will operate to prevent adverse transfer tax expo-
sure. Thus, the benefits of the gift lost if no transfer had been made would be
absorbed anyway.
193. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958).
194. This technique was approved in Haygood v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 936 (1964), acq.
1965-1 C.B. 4, nonacq. 1977-2 C.B.2; Estate v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 321 (1974),
nonacq. 1977-2 C.B. 2. The government does not acquiesce in these results. Rev.
Rul. 77-299, 1977-2 C.B. 343.
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sure that similarly oriented practices do not become abusive,
intrafamily activities are closely monitored to see whether the tax sav-
ings ends are achieved through acceptable means. Of immediate inter-
est is the scrutiny given transfers for purposes of the gift tax.1 95 The
government jealously guards is broad interpretation of "gift" to block
clever attempts to obtain more donor benefits than are perhaps
deserved.
Although not specifically defined by statute, "gift" has been con-
sistently interpreted to include all gratuitous transfers.196 Donative
intent is not an essential element of the transfer tax gift, since the
term "gratuitous" is measured by consideration received in return for
the transfer.197 Questions continue to arise, however, over whether a
transfer was actually made, and if so, of what or by whom. The an-
swers to these inquiries have important transfer tax ramifications. A
quick look at some recent developments in the area will illustrate how
donors' efforts to obtain tax benefits have been thwarted by the gov-
ernment's vigilance.
The intrafamily interest-free loan has long received favorable in-
come tax treatment. 98 When the government first attacked on the
gift tax front it suffered defeat.199 Renewed pursuit, however,
culminated in a glowing victory.
195. This is not to suggest that "gifts" are a dead issue in the income tax arena. Com-
missioner v. Duberstein, 343 U.S. 278 (1960), and its progeny are testimony to the
fact that the income tax aspects of this issue are alive and well. However, trans-
fers made in the estate planning setting are usually not pursued for income tax
purposes. But see Hardee v. United States 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (the gov-
ernment unsuccessfully sought to include imputed interest on an interest-free
loan in income).
196. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958) (interest passes gratuitously); Dickman v.
Commisioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984) (imputed interest on interest free loan is a
gift); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945) (property transferred to com-
pensate for lost trust income is a gift); Smith v. Shaughnessey, 318 U.S. 176 (1943)
(transfer of life estate with reversion and remainder interests in a gift). The gen-
esis of this broad interpretation can be found in the legislative history of the gift
tax. See H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part
2) 457, 476 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 39, reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. (Part 2) 496, 524 (1932).
197. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). See also
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (gift tax imposed when prop-
erty transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration other than that
made in the ordinary course of business).
198. See Hardee v. United Stat,.,s, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Commissioner v.
Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st
Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649 Fed. 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Suttle v. Com-
missioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083
(1961), nonacq. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
199. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
[Vol. 64:25
TAX POSTURE OF GIFTS
In Dickman v. United States,20 0 the Supreme Court held that in-
terest-free loans involve transfers of property that are within the am-
bit of the gift tax. The Court pointed out that Congress intended the
use "property" in its most comprehensive sense201 and concluded that
"property rights" were meant to be included in the definition.20 2 The
use of money is perhaps the best example of such a property right, and
therefore is properly subject to the tax. The Court had little difficulty
in overcoming the taxpayer's contention that there was no actual
transfer of property because the donor retained control over the notes.
It found that although the demand notes themselves were still within
the lender-donor's domain and control, it was the donee's free use of
the principal which constituted a transfer.203 The tax attaches only to
the "reasonable value of the use of money lent,"20 4 which is a com-
pleted gift for the period of time in which the lender-donor does not
call in the loan. The Court may have settled the seminal matter con-
cerning the applicability of the gift tax to interest free loans, but it
certainly did not put the issue to quietus. Some questions were left
unanswered. How is the gift valued?20 5 Are gift tax returns for previ-
ous years required? What impact will prior interest-free loan periods
have on adjusted taxable gifts?
The more troublesome aspect of the Dickman opinion is the
Court's sweeping assertion that all gratuitous uses of property are in
effect potential taxable gifts.206 The Court tried to downplay the sig-
nificance of the position by pointing to the annual exclusion and uni-
fied credit as ways to avoid any tax exposure. But, as suggested in the
dissenting opinion the attempted dilution misses the mark.20 7 The
majority's interpretation of what constitutes a transfer for gift tax
purposes has probably exposed to the gift tax transfers never before
considered within its reach.208 The onus is now on the government
200. 104 S. Ct. 1086 (1984).
201. Id- at 1089.
202. I& at 1089-90.
203. Id- at 1091 n.7.
204. Id- at 1094-95.
205. The valuation problem is discussed in the dissent where it is noted that the gov-
ernment has used three different methods for valuing such transfers. Id. at 1097-
98, 1098 n.9. The Treasury Department quickly responsed to this concern. See
Announcement 84-60, 1984-23 I.R.B. 58 (concerning News Release I.R.-84-60, May
11, 1984). The department provided applicable interest rates for years as far back
as 1960 and examples of how to apply them. The announcment also promised
that a revenue procedure would be forthcoming on this matter. Congress then
addressed the problem, see TRA 84, supra note 19, § 172, by adding § 7872 to the
code, which provides an elaborate set of rules for handling the tax consequences
of loans with below market rates.
206. The Court specifically makes reference to the rent free use of commercial prop-
erty having a rental value. Id at 1091.
207. Id at 1098 (Powell, J., dissenting).
208. The dissent points out that the potential abominations include taxing rent free
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not to overact to its new authority and proceed within the spirit of the
Court's decision.209 Many problems remain unresolved. Thus, trans-
ferors must use care in order to avoid unexpected tax results.
The interest-free loan is an example of the government pressing to
prove a transfer. In other instances, the government focuses its atten-
tion on who the transferor is and what is actually being transferred.
In Exchange Bank and Trust Co. of Florida v. United States,2 1o the
government was concerned with the former issue. It succeeded in in-
voking the reciprocal trust doctrine211 over custodial accounts which
the decedent neither formally transferred nor had any interest in.
The decedent and his spouse had each made gifts to their minor chil-
dren naming the other as custodian of their respective transfers.
Since neither retained a substantial economic interest in the property
transferred, the estate argued that there was no basis for gross estate
inclusion.212 Unfortunately, the court dismissed this contention and
held that, because of the interrelated nature of the cross-custodian-
ships, the decedent was, for tax purposes, the custodian of the prop-
erty he transferred. Thus the gift was included in the donor-
decedent's gross estate, 213 depriving him of the chief tax benefits of
use of a home by an adult child or free use of the family car. Id. at 1097 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
209. The Court assumes that the Internal Revenue Service will not focus upon the
traditional intrafamily or neighborly transaction, and, if it does, suggests that
"there will be time enough to deal with such a case." Id at 1093. In Announce-
ment 84-60, 1984-23 I.R.B. 58, the Service stated that it would not require gift tax
returns for pre-1984 interest-free demand loan gifts if the average annual out-
standing balance of such notes did not exceed $50,000 ($100,000 for married tax-
payers). Although the reason for this restraint was attributed to administrative
convenience, it may spill over to other vulnerable transfers.
210. 694 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
211. The reciprocal trust doctrine, originated in Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99
(2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940), and approved in United States v. Es-
tate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), basically applies a substance over form test to
determine the "true" transferor of property. The doctrine is best explained by
example. If A conveys Blackacre giving B a life estate and C the remainder, and B
simultaneously conveys Whiteacre, giving A a life estate and C the remainder,
then for the purposes of applying I.R.C. §§ 2036 & 2038 (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp.
1984), A is considered to be the transferor of Whiteacre and B the transferor of
Blackacre. Now both A and B are transferors of property over which each has
retained an interest and the transfers are susceptible to gross estate inclusion.
212. The estate tried to distinguish Grace on this ground. It was argued that Grace
essentially stands for the proposition that to be a transferor an individual must
have an economic interest in the transferred property. Exchange Bank and Trust
Co. of Fla. v. United States, 694 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
213. To the extent transferor is the custodian of property subject to the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Acts the custodial property is includable in the gross estate of the
transferor-custodian under § 2038(a). Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 C.B. 193. See also
Stuit v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1971) (Ill. law); Eichstedt v. United
States, 345 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (Cal. law); Estate of Jacoby v. Commis-
sioner, 29 T.C.M. 737 (1970) (Mo. law).
[Vol. 64:25
TAX POSTURE OF GIFTS
making the gift.
The cost of losing tax benefits associated with gift giving because
the transfer is eventually made part of the gross estate can become
quite expensive when life insurance is involved. This point was made
painfully clear in Kurihara v. United States214 where the issue was not
whether a gift was made or who made it, but actually centered on
what property had been transferred by the donor. In Kurihara, the
decedent established an irrevocable trust agreement which identified
him as the "initiator" of a one million dollar life insurance policy. The
trustee, an independent party, formally applied for the life insurance
on the same day. The application provided that the policy would not
take effect until, inter alia, the first premium had been paid. The pol-
icy was issued in August. In September, the grantor-decedent drew a
check in the amount of the premium payable to the trustee. The
trustee then endorsed the check over to the insurer. The grantor died
unexpectedly in an accident shortly thereafter. The estate excluded
the policy from the decedent's gross estate because the decedent had
no interest in either the policy or the trust. The government sought to
include the proceeds of the policy in the gross estate pursuant to sec-
tion 2035215 on the theory that the policy itself, and not merely the
premium, had been transferred by the decedent within three years of
death. The central issue then became, what characteristics control
making a transfer: the formal procedure or the underlying substance?
The court unsurpisingly opted for the latter. This result should not,
however, be construed as condemning all life insurance transfers to a
similar fate. The court clearly expressed that the facts compelled
them to conclude that the trustee had acted only as the decedent's
agent.21 6 Thus, the decedent's initial premium payment created own-
ership rights for the trustees and constituted a transfer of the policy
for purposes of section 2035. The court conceded that under different
circumstances (primarily if the trustee was not obligated to use the
check to pay for insurance) the relevent gift for purposes of applying
section 2035 would be of the funds supplied by the decedent. 217 The
nature of insurance makes it critically important for taxpayers to ad-
here to the form that safeguards the substance.218
The illustrations should leave no doubt that from or structure be a
foremost tax planning concern. The format employed can strike to
214. 82 T.C. 51 (1984).
215. The court notes that the transfer in issue was subject to § 2035 prior to its amend-
ment by ERTA. 82 T.C. 51, 51 n.1 (1984). However, the issue of whether the
transaction in dispute constitutes a transfer retains its importance because life
insurance is still pulled back into the gross estate if it is transferred within three
years of death. See I.R.C. § 2035(d)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
216. Kurihara v. United States, 82 T.C. 51 (1984).
217. Id at 58. See Hope v. United States, 691 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982).
218. The tax difference in Kurihara amounted to $317,513.19.
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the heart of the gift tax itself (i.e., is there a transfer at all), or become
a material issue when the donor's gross estate is ultimately computed
(i.e., what was transferred and by whom). Despite the government's
effort to ensure that constructive or disguised transfers are uncovered
and treated appropriately, the proper form of a transfer can nonethe-
less be the legitimate means to a desire end. However, as with its in-
come tax counterpart, it seems, the transfer tax benefits associated
with gifts are available only when donors are realistically willing to
part with dominion and control.
B. Choice of Asset
Any discussion of gifts and taxes in an estate planning setting
would be incomplete if the "choice of asset" aspect of the situation
were ignored. The proper choice of asset to be given away can be a
crucial decision. If a gift is made with an eye toward tax benefits, it
becomes incumbent upon the tax planner to maximize the advantage.
Since gifts are not made in isolated tax environments, the impact of
the transfer must be measured by both its income tax and transfer tax
consequences. Donors usually consider their own tax needs first, but
may secondarily concern themselves with the impact the gifts will
have on the donees. In this way the best synergystic result can be
obtained at the expense of the government.219 Prompting the need to
select assets carefully is the fact that the donor's desire to limit his
transfer tax exposure may conflict with the effort to minimize income
tax consequences. This conflict arises because the transfer taxes are
directed at lifetime ownership value, whereas the income tax is only
charged to annual realized increases in capital.
Viewed solely from a transfer tax perspective the donor will want
to transfer an asset that is expected to appreciate in value, produce
unneeded income, or do a combination of both. This, of course, follows
from the fact that transfer tax benefits do not result from the actual
value given away, but from related elements. The ability to exclude
post-transfer appreciation and earnings from future transfer tax expo-
sure is a chief attraction of gift giving. Thus, it is imperative that gifts
be of assets capable of providing future growth or earnings. The
greater the asset's appreciation and/or earning potential, the higher
the chance that transfer tax savings will be achieved. The correlation
is straight forward and requires little elaboration.
The income tax considerations must be viewed from a slightly dif-
ferent perspective. The donor has to determine the impact, if any, the
219. When planning an estate, it is sometimes best to look at the end results rather
than the immediate advantage to be gained. Thus, to transfer the most value at
the least cost, one must examine the effects on both the donor and the donee.
This practice is not uncommon since most estate planning situations involve close
family members.
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gift will have on his own taxes, and may or may not be concerned with
the tax effect the transfer will have on the donee. It is quite possible
that the best asset to be given is also the worst to be received.
Only the donor's adjusted basis of appreciated property can pass to
a donee absolutely free from any income tax. The donee's subsequent
sale of the asset, assuming it does not decline in value, will trigger
adverse tax consequences. Therefore, the donee would prefer to re-
ceive property that has not substantially appreciated in value. Unfor-
tunately, appreciated assets may be exactly the type of property the
donor is willing to give away, especially if he does not want to pay
taxes on the appreciation himself. Of course, if the donor is in a posi-
tion where he does not have to convert the property for his own per-
sonal needs, the problem is partially ameliorated, and such an asset
can be retained without harm. But there is no guarantee that the do-
nor will be able to hold the property indefinitely. A change in eco-
nomic climate may dictate the donor's dispostion of the asset and
saddle him with the unwanted tax accounting.
If property is held until death it will be transferred as a tax inheri-
tance.220 Although both gifts and inheritances are tax free receipts, 221
the latter can be more favorable because the donee will receive a basis
equal to the property's fair market value on the date of the decedent's
death222 instead of carry-over basis.223 The advantage of the so-called
"stepped up" basis rule is evident. All appreciation on this property is
forever eliminated from income tax accounting, and the post-death
owner is only required to pay taxes on the appreciation occurring dur-
ing his ownership. Thus, all else being equal, donees would prefer to
receive assets which have little or no built-in gain as gifts, and acquire
substantial appreciation through inheritance. Following this formula
will mninimize the donee's income tax exposure on the ultimate dispo-
sition of assets received by gift and avoid tax on pre-death appreciation
for inherited property.
Unfortunately for donees, this path does not always provide the
donor the tax incentives he wants. One of the donor's reasons for
making the gift may be to shift appreciation away from his own high
tax bracket and over to that of the donee. Of course, the donee will
(or should) not decline the gift merely because the specific asset to be
received will generate a tax liability upon its disposition. Even if
taxed at the highest rate, there is still a substantial economic benefit
220. Section 102(a) is quite general and specifically includes bequests and devises as
inheritances, which is the title of the section. This section has been broadly con-
strued to include most forms of testamentary receipts. I.R.C. § 102(a) (Law Co-
op. 1974 & Supp. 1984). See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
221. I.R.C. § 102(a) (Law Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
222. Id § 1014. But see id., § 1014(e) (prohibiting the "step-up" in certain situations).
223. Id § 1015.
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in receiving the appreciation-laden asset. The donee is always assured
of an increase in wealth equal to at least the donor's adjusted basis
plus one-half of the built-in gain.224 The same can be said for income-
producing assets. The donee cannot be unhappy with the receipt of
such property since, even in the worst of tax scenarios, one half of the
income along with the donor's adjusted basis in the property is still
added to the donee's personal capital account. Remembering that
transfer tax considerations will prompt the donor to give away prop-
erty believed to be capable of future appreciation, it is quite possible
that such assets will be ones that already have experienced some
growth. Thus, they become even more likely gift candidates, even
though the donee may prefer to receive such assets upon the death of
the donor.
Can one achieve the best of both worlds? Perhaps, with a little
manipulation of the new transfer tax rules one can. Consider the indi-
vidual who gives appreciated property to an elderly relative and then
reacquires it through inheritance soon thereafter. Assuming all of the
donee-decedent's assets, including the value of the gift, are shielded
from transfer tax by the unified credit, the donor could reacquire his
own property with a stepped-up basis and no transfer tax costs. This
simple maneuver permits an income tax saving on all of the apprecia-
tion in the hands of the donor. Although Congress foresaw this prob-
lem and closed the loophole before it could be used,225 some room for
maneuverability and the opportunity to obtain a limited step-up in ba-
sis remains. 22 6
It seems that the new unlimited marital deduction provides an op-
portunity for some income tax advantages. The marital deduction
now permits free transfers of assets between spouses. Consequently
all property acquired because of the death of the spouse will not gen-
erate any transfer tax liability, but will nonetheless be given a
stepped-up basis. The best of both worlds is assured.
The situation becomes a little more complex, however, when joint
interests are involved. Upon surviving her spouse, what basis does a
widow take in the previous joint assets? The moiety that became hers
by reason of her husband's death will undoubtedly take a stepped-up
basis. But what of the other half? If she had purchased the moiety,
then she has a cost basis and there are no difficulties. But what if she
224. This results because the receipt of the property is tax free but the donee acquires
a carry-over basis. Thus the donor's adjusted basis is received free of tax. Any
appreciation acquired may have to be accounted for by the donee in taxes, but the
highest tax bracket is 50 percent. Consequently, the donor's adjusted basis and
the untaxed half of the appreciation is received free. Id § 102(a).
225. I& § 1014(e).
226. To the extent the donor is willing to (1) transfer property in the hope that the
donee will survive the one-year taint period of 1014(e), id., and (2) devise the
property to the donor, the "step-up" can be obtained.
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received her interest by gift from her husband? Does she take one-
half of her husband's original basis in the entire property or, since she
supplied no consideration for the property, is her basis in this moiety
zero? Similarly, what happens if the husband survives? Does he get a
step-up in basis predicated upon his contribution or is he limited to a
"step-up" for only the moiety in which he is reacquiring full title?
The answers to these questions may have a significant effect on inter-
spousal generosity.
Without having fully explored the matter, it should be apparent
that choosing the correct asset to give away can be important. Not all
assets are appropriate gift candidates. The trade-off created by the
"carry-over" and "step-up" basis rules and the impact of the transfer
tax benefits force the donors to carefully think out the most advanta-
geous way to go about completing the transaction. These competing
interests often make selecting the best asset a somewhat difficult
decision.
IV. SIMPLIFIED ESTATE PLANNING
Since the instant primary objective is to investigate whether there
are still sufficient tax incentives to prompt gift giving, it is not neces-
sary to scrutinize new estate planning practices ushered in by the re-
cent tax changes. Perhaps, however, some discussion noting the
proper role of gifts in the overall estate planning picture is warranted.
To this end some very general models will be introduced. The broad
asset value range for each model is a deliberate effort to reinforce the
fact that the discussion is not intended to be a detailed analysis, but
instead, is designed to suggest generally how gifts can be of tax useful-
ness. The value ranges correspond to the full implementation of the
$192,000 credit ($600,000 taxable transfer equivalency) due in 1987.
Thus, for planning in earlier years, the threshold figures should be
adjusted downward to the appropriate credit level for the year in ques-
tion. Also, because of the limited scope of the analysis, it must be
remembered that there is actually a great deal of maneuverability be-
yond the suggestions.
In small estates, up to the applicable unified credit equivalent, gifts
will not offer any transfer tax benefits since these estates will not be
concerned with the transfer taxes. If and when growth (earnings and/
or appreciation) increases the estate values above the then applicable
taxing threshold level, gifts may be capable of playing a limited role.
At that time individuals might be willing or able to part with some
assets to achieve tax benefits.2 2 7 Once the accumulated wealth ex-
ceeds the applicable unified credit threshold, gifts can be used to cre-
227. There may also be an inheritance tax consequence in this value range. These
taxes, where still applicable, can be reduced by gift-giving programs. The exemp-
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ate and maintain a non-taxable estate level, and thereby eliminate the
transfer tax entirely.
Most probably, income taxes are the pressing tax concern of indi-
viduals in this low value estate range. Unfortunately, there is proba-
bly little that gift giving can do to alleviate the burden. Generally,
taxpayers at the lower end of this group will not have sufficient assets
to permit them to make gifts and obtain the related benefits. They
will need the assets for their own care. For practical reasons it is un-
certain whether individuals at the higher end of the range will be ca-
pable of parting with the property. Despite the possibility of a
relatively high value, the assets may be quite illiquid and not readily
transferable. For example, pension and insurance benefits or a per-
sonal residence may represent potential high asset values, but are not
realistic gift candidates. Moreover, these types of assets are not in
themselves income tax burdens and therefore would not provide the
tax benefit usually associated with gifts.
On balance, it seems fair to conclude that gifts will serve little tax
purpose for individuals in the lowest net worth range. Concededly,
there might be some isolated instances where an income tax advan-
tage can be achieved, e.g., where a short term trust could be used as a
support vehicle for an elderly relative. But without the transfer tax
consequences as a prime concern, from a pure tax perspective gifts are
not particularly useful planning tools for individuals in this group.
In medium sized estates (values ranging from the unified credit
equivalent to twice the dollar equivalent amount, or ultimately up to
$1,200,000) there is still a role for gifts to play. Gifts can reduce a do-
nor-decedent's net worth below the taxable base equivalency for the
applicable credit level. Moreover, through felicitous use of the annual
exclusion, this can probably be accomplished without incurring a gift
tax cost. Of course, to the extent a surviving spouse would succeed to
the property, the marital deduction would eliminate any immediate
tax exposure and gifts would not be immediately necessary. It must
be realized, however, that the marital deduction does not eliminate
the tax liability completely, but merely serves to delay or postpone it.
Assuming there is no remarriage, the surviving spouse will eventually
leave an estate that will not have the benefit of the marital deduction.
The net effect of the deduction then is merely to shift all of the prop-
erty and the concomitant tax problems into the survivor's lap. A sim-
ple example can demonstrate how the full use of the marital
deduction, i.e., transferring one's entire estate tax free to a surviving
spouse, is only a deferral technique and is not always the best path to
follow.
tions are generally lower than the unified credit and, therefore, even in this low
value range, tax exposure is possible.
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Assume two married couples-H and W, and P and M-each have
an estate of $1,000,000, and all of the property is in the names of W
and M for each of the respective families. None of the individuals
have ever made any taxable transfers. For simplicity's sake it is as-
sumed that there are no available deductions other than the marital
deduction and that all events occur after 1987. H and W have estate
plans that call for all of the property owned by either of them to pass
outright to the survivor. M and F have executed documents that will
create an "A-B" trust distribution upon the death of either. That is,
one half of the property will pour-over into a trust which qualifies for
the marital deduction;228 the other half will be held in a trust which
the survivor will have only a life income interest, with the remainder
passing to other beneficiaries.
Upon W's death there is no estate tax exposure. The marital de-
duction will be equal to the adjusted gross estate and will result in a
taxable estate of zero dollars and no tax liability. When H eventually
dies, there will be a $1,000,000 taxable estate and a $153,000 tax liabil-
ity.229 Clearly, the marital deduction did not eliminate the tax, but
merely postponed its collection.
When M dies there will be a $500,000 taxable estate but no tax will
be due because of the unified credit.230 Nor will there be any tax due
upon Fs subsequent death. F will have a $500,000 taxable estate and
the same tax consequence as M. The net result is that the transfer
taxes are completely avoided.
Although felicitous use of the marital deduction in conjunction
with the two unified credits can eventually shield up to $1,200,000231 of
family wealth from the transfer tax exposure, this will not always
happen. First, until 1987, the protected amounts must be reduced ac-
cording to the phase-in schedule of the unified credit. Second, popular
forms of ownership such as joint tenancy can easily obstruct the tax
228. Property held in trust will qualify for the marital deduction provided the require-
ments of § 2056(b)(5) are met. Basically the spouse must have a general power of
appointment, even if only testamentary, coupled with a life estate in the qualify-
ing corpus.
229. The tax on $1,000,000 is computed as follows:
Tentative Tax Base $1,000,000
Tentative Tax 345,800
Gift Taxes Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800
Estate Tax Liability $ 153,000
230. A detailed computation is really not necessary since the gross estate equivalent of
the unified credit is known to be $600,000. This is more than enough to shield M's
estate from tax exposure.
231. Each individual is entitled to a unified credit. Therefore, a couple can use two,
one for each spouse, and thus protect $1,200,000 from transfer taxation.
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efficacy of an "A-B" trust distribution plan.232 But, interspousal gifts
and concomitant estate equalization can minimize the prospect of tax
exposure by guaranteeing the availability of two credits. For these
reasons, gifts can still play a key role for even otherwise seemingly
safe tax positions.
An interesting progeny of the unified credit is a variation on the
"A-B" theme: the unified credit trust plan. Basically, this plan in-
cludes two trusts: a marital trust which qualifies for the marital de-
duction and a unified credit trust which does not. The unified credit
trust is funded with an amount equal to the taxable equivalent of the
applicable unified credit at the time of the decedent's death. The trust
income can be payable to the surviving spouse with the corpus passing
to other beneficiaries upon that spouse's death. The remainder of the
estate falls into the marital trust. Upon the decedent's death there is
no tax exposure. The full value of the marital trust is deductible and
leaves a taxable estate equal to the value of' the unified credit trust.
The tax on this latter amount will be eliminated by the unified
credit.233 Upon the survivor's death, another unified credit will be
available and it can be used to help offset any tax liability created by
marital trust assets which will be included in the survivor's gross es-
tate.234 The unified credit trust is not includable in the survivor's
gross estate.235 A taxpayer using this format can maximize the use of
two unified credits and also obtain the tax deferral advantage of the
marital deduction.
Gifts are a potentially valuable tool for those individuals in this
middle value range who eschew estate equalization in favor of tax
deferral under full utilization of the marital deduction. The gift giving
burden, however, will be on the surviving spouse. The primary objec-
232. The "A-B" can only work if there are sufficient assets for the decedent to pass at
death. Title to jointly owned assets will remain in the survivng tenant regardless
of any will or trust provisions attempting to create an "A-B" disposition. If too
much property is jointly held between spouses there will be insufficient asset
values to by-pass the survivor's estate in the "B" part. A simple example will
illustrate the point.
Decedent died with a net estate of $1,000,000, $700,000 of which was jointly
held with his wife. The decedent had only $300,000 to put into a "B" trust since
the wife automatically acquired full title to the tenancy property. The wife is left
with an amount in excess of the unified credit equivalent, and, with her estate,
will suffer tax exposure unless it is somehow reduced. Thus, even though the
husband did not encounter an estate tax (a result of the marital deduction and
unified credit), the full benefit of the "A-B" distribution was lost.
233. The dispositive instrument must be worded carefully to ensure that the trust will
be funded with an amount of property equal to the unified credit equivalent for
the year of the decedent's death.
234. Property qualifying for the marital deduction in the estate of the first spouse will
be included, to the extent it exists, in the estate of the surviving spouse.
235. The surviving spouse is either given a non-taxable income interest in the unified
credit trust or is not a beneficiary at all.
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tive will be to move property tax free out of the survivor's estate. Un-
fortunately, the only vehicles for this effort will be the annual
exclusions. Although the other tax benefits associated with gift giving
will be present they will offer little assistance in remedying the prob-
lem created by the first spouse leaving the entire estate to the survi-
vor. Post-transfer appreciation and earning will escape ultimate
taxation, but these items are only additions to the property that is the
source of the true problem: the wealth acquired from the deceased
spouse. The same can be said for any benefits flowing from the elimi-
nation of gift taxation from the estate tax base. Despite the magni-
tude of the job, the annual exclusion is up to the task.
In the earlier example which left H with $1,000,000, consider what
a simple gift program could have accomplished. If H had two primary
beneficiaries and five years to work with, $100,000 could have been
taken out of the estate tax base tax free. This would have left a
$900,000 taxable estate and a $114,000 estate tax payable,236 a nifty tax
savings of $41,000. Given more time and a larger number of benefi-
ciaries, a more significant reduction in the tax exposure could have
been made.
Of course, throughout this entire analysis it has been assumed that
the asset poor spouse is the survivor. What happens if the asset rich
spouse survives? All of the problems encountered in the preceding
examples remain. A taxpayer will be left with property exceeding the
available unified credit. The same benefits conferred by gifts in the
other examples are again present. Clearly gifts still have a transfer
tax usefulness in the middle size estate range.
Perhaps of equal importance to medium-sized estate taxpayers are
the income tax savings that can be achieved through gift giving. These
individuals can probably afford the loss of the use of property for lim-
ited periods of time and benefit from deflecting income through short
term trusts. Also, some may be in a sufficiently secure economic posi-
tion to make outright gifts, the cost of which can be reduced by the
future income tax savings flowing from transferred appreciation and
earnings thereon. Although possibly insufficient to motivate a gift,
these factors when coupled with the potential transfer tax benefits
make gifts quite attractive.
236. Computed as follows:
Tentative Tax Base $900,000*
Tentative Tax 306,800 [§ 2001(c)(1)]
Gift Tax Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
Estate Tax Payable $114,000
*Even though transfers were made, the annual exclusion prevented
them from becoming taxable gifts. Correspondingly, they are not
adjusted taxable'gifts to be added into the tentative tax base.
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For large estates (values in excess of double the applicable unified
credit equivalent: $1,200,000 and higher) all of the direct benefits of
gift giving come into play. Gifts are the most profitable for individuals
in this range. Since the accumulated wealth exceeds two unified
credit equivalents, it is impossible to "stand pat" and avoid the imposi-
tion of the tax. Again, full use of the marital deduction only defers the
tax but does not waive it. And, unfortunately, "A-B" trusts will not
provide the relief in this wealth bracket that was had in the lower
value-ranged estates. Once this level of wealth has been accumulated
taxpayers must take a close look at the numbers and plan accordingly.
Consider first the consequences of fully utilizing the marital deduc-
tion to effecuate a complete tax deferral. The survivor is left with
enough property to possibly be pushed into the highest marginal
transfer tax bracket. Thus, although the government had to wait to
get its share, what it finally receives may be the highest possible
amount. Taxable estate division through an "A-B" disposition plan
could, however, have lessened the government's share. Although both
estates will pay a tax, by dividing the wealth equally, the overall tax
paid by the family unit would be less. This happens because a second
unified credit is used and lower marginal tax rates are applied to the
taxed property.237 Even so, eventually an accumulated wealth level is
reached that, when halved, the highest marginal brackets still apply.
The "A-B" plan becomes less and less appealing as wealth levels reach
that amount. Also, even if the "A-B" plan provides an overall tax sav-
ing, when compared to the results from a full marital deduction plan,
it is necessary to take into account the loss of the use of the tax money
paid by the estate of the first spouse. Viewed from this perspective,
the complete deferral may be more advantageous despite the fact that
the total tax liability itself is higher. The time value of money concept
makes the unified credit trust plan even more attractive to the extent
that it primarily postpones the tax while simultaneously using two
unified credits to minimize the overall tax due.
There can be no doubt that, in this high value estate range, gifts
can play a major role in minimizing transfer taxes. All four of the
earlier noted direct benefits can work in unison to assist in the effort.
The following hypothetical should illustrate the positive impact gifts
can have in estate planning for prospective donors with substantial
wealth.
By tracing the tax consequences of J and K, the potency of gifts as
237. The advantage of the unified credit is readily apparent. By 1985, any taxable
value in excess of $2,500,000 will be taxed at a 50 percent marginal rate. Thus,
once the sum of these two figures is reached, there is no way to minimize taxes
through rate manipulation. However, when asset values are below this amount,
property can be split between taxpayers to obtain access to lower rates and less
tax exposure.
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tax saving devices in the asset value range can be fully explored. Both
are widows whose only property is the respective estates left to them
by their deceased husbands. Each husband left his entire estate worth
$4,000,000 to his wife and did not pay any transfer taxes courtesy of
the marital deduction. J and K have each invested their wealth identi-
cally in the following mix of assets: $3,000,000 in low-income produc-
ing, static assets; $600,000 in tax-exempt income securities generating
a ten percent yield; and $400,000 in a speculative non-dividend paying
stock issue. The income, net of income taxes, from the static assets, is
exactly equal to each widow's living needs and is entirely consumed
annually. Both widows have two children who are expected to share
their mothers' estates equally. Assume that each widow dies at the
end of the fifth year following her husband's death and, by that time,
the speculative stock has doubled in value and is then worth $800,000.
J never made any gifts during her lifetime. Her entire estate will pass
to her children in two equal shares through an inter vivos revocable
trust. K, on the other hand, pursued an active gift giving program im-
mediately following her husband's death. In Year One she gave each
of her children $150,000 worth of the speculative stock ($300,000 total).
In Years Two through Five, inclusive, she gave each child $50,000
worth of fixed income securities. All the remaining assets were placed
in a trust identical to the one established by J. Assuming that all of
these events occurred after 1987 and disregarding any estate tax de-
ductions that may be available, the comparative results are set out be-
low, and prove the value of gifts as pure tax saving tools.
J's gross estate, and, for the purposes herein, taxable estate, will
include the date of death value of all of the revocable trust assets. 238
The trust corpus includes the $3,000,000 worth of static assets; $600,000
worth of fixed income securities; $300,000 of income generated by the
securities; 2 39 and the speculative stock woth $800,000. The taxable es-
tate is, therefore, $4,700,000, and the estate tax payable thereon is
$1,933,000.240 The property, net of transfer taxes, passing to the chil-
dren is $2,767,000, which means each child will receive $1,383,500.
238. The power to revoke the trust will make the copies fully includable in the gross
estate. I.R.C. § 2038(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984).
239. The actual amount could be higher since the money earned would probably be
reinvested. For example, if a modest five percent after tax returned is assumed,
the $60,000 per year would be worth $331,538 by the beginning of year six.
($60,000 5.52563 (the factor at 5 percent for amount of five-year ordinary annuity)
= $331,538).
240. Computed as follows:
Tentative Tax Base $4,700,000
Tentative Tax 1,655,800 [ §2001(c)(1)]
Gift Tax Payable -0-
Unified Credit 192,800 [§ 2010(a)]
Estate Tax Payable $1,463,000
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In contrast, K will have completely different transfer tax conse-
quences. To the extent that these consequences are more favorable
than J's, the advantage can be directly attributed to the gifts, since
they are the only distinguishing factors between the two situations.
In Year One, K made total gifts of $300,000, but did not incure an
out-of-pocket gift tax cost since the taxable gifts of $280,000 ($300,000
minus a $10,000 annual exclusion for each donee) generated only a
$81,000 gift tax,2 41 which was more than eliminated by the available
$192,800 unified credit. In Year Two, K made additional total gifts of
$100,000, but again no immediate out-of-pocket tax cost was encoun-
tered, because of the gift tax on the $80,000 taxable transfer was only
$27,200242 and still shielded by the unused portion of the unified
credit.243 In fact, over the years, despite the numerous gifts, K will not
be required to pay any gift tax whatsoever. 24 4
241. The gift tax computation is as follows:
Aggregate Current and Prior Taxable Gifts
Tentative Tax Thereon
Tentative Tax on Prior Taxable Gifts
Tax Imposed
Unified Credit
Gift Tax Payable
242. Computed as follows:
Aggregate Current and Prior
$280,000
81,000 (A) [§2012(a)]
-0- (B)
81,000 (C) = (A)-(B)
$192,800 (D) [§ 2010(a)]
-0- (C) - (D)
Taxable Gifts $360,000*
Tentative Tax Thereon 108,200 [§ 2012(a)]
Tentative Tax on Prior Taxable Gifts 81,000*"
Tax Imposed 27,200
Unified Credit $111,800* [§ 2010(a)]
Tax Payable -0-
*Current taxable gifts of $80,000 plus prior taxable gifts of $280,000.
**Tax on taxable gifts of $280,000.
***This represents the $192,800 credit reduced by the $81,000 used in the
prior periods. See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
243. The credit against the gift tax must be reduced by prior years' use. Id § 2505. See
also Rev. Rul. 79-160, 1979-1 C.B. 313 (making the use of the credit mandatory).
244. The following schedule illustrates the point:
(A) B1  (C)2  (D) (E)
Current
Current Total Use of
Total Taxable Taxable Tax Unified
Year Transfers Transfers Transfers Imposed Credit
1
2
3
4
5
Total
$300,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
$700,000
$280,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
$600,000
$280,0005
360,000
440,000
520,000
600,000
$81,000
27,200
27,200
27,800
29,600
$192,800
$81,000
27,200
27,200
27,800
29,600
(F)3  (G)4
Credit Tax
Remaining Payable
$111,8006 0
84,600 0
57,400 0
29,600 0
0 0
1. Total transfers minus available annual exclusions.
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Upon K's death, her taxable estate will be comprised of the trust
assets. The $3,000,000 worth of static assets is still present, but only
$200,000 worth of the fixed income securities are left.245 Moreover,
the securities have generated only $200,000 of earnings for K (the bal-
ance of the $300,000 total having inured to the benefit of the do-
nees). 246 Also, only one-fourth of the speculative securities, $200,000
worth, are includable in K's gross estate.247 Her taxable estate is,
therefore, $2,600,000. It must be remembered, however, that in deter-
mining her estate tax liability all adjusted taxable gifts have to be ad-
ded to the taxable estate to calculate the tentative estate tax from
which the actual estate tax payable is computed. In the instant case,
although K transferred $700,000 of value, only $600,000 are adjusted
taxable gifts.248 Thus, the tentative estate tax base is $4,200,000 and
the estate tax payable is $1,653,000.249 Since K did not incure any gift
taxes on her inter vivos gifts, the $1,653,000 also represents her total
2. Current year's taxable transfer (B) plus previous year's total taxable transfers.
3. Previous year's balance (F) minus current year's use (E).
4. (D) minus (E).
5. Since this is the first year of transfers, current taxable transfers equal total taxable
transfers.
6. Assumes no prior use of unified credit. Thus opening credit balance was $192,800.
245. The original $600,000 figure reduced by the four annual $100,000 ($50,000 per
child) transfers.
246. Assuming that interest is earned at year's end and gifts are made at the beginning
of the year, K's earnings are:
INCOME PRODUCING EARNINGS
Fund at 10%
1 $600,000 $ 60,000
2 500,000 50,000
3 400,000 40,000
4 300,000 30,000
5 200,000 20,000
Total $200,000
*Previous year's amount minus current year's gift.
247. Since $300,000 worth of the original $400,000 of securities was given away, only
$100,000 of the initial investment is left. Based upon its having doubled in value,
it is worth $200,000.
248. The annual exclusions for each donee each year are not part of adjusted taxable
gifts.
249. Computed as follows:
Taxable Estate $3,600,000 (A)
Adjusted Taxable Gifts 600,000 (B)
Tentative Tax Base 4,140,000 (A) + (B)
Tentative Tax 1,845,800 (C)
Gift Tax Payable -0- (D)
Unified Credit 192,800 (E)
Estate Tax Payable $1,653,000 (C) - (D + E)
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transfer tax charge. The total value of property, net of transfer taxes,
passing to her children is $3,047,000 (or $1,523,500 each). This amounts
to an additional $140,000 per child, or $280,000 in overall tax savings
effected by the gifts.
The $280,000 saving can be further linked to the different ways in
which gifts provide tax benefits. The instant computation is made
easy by the fact that all values excluded from transfer taxation in K's
estate are in the fifty percent marginal tax bracket. Thus, one can
quickly determine that the use of $10,000 annual exclusions produced
a $50,000 transfer tax savings: fifty percent of the total $100,000 es-
caped transfer taxation entirely. Although the gifts of securities and
stock did not in themselves provide a benefit (these items were made
part of the tentative estate tax base despite the fact that K no longer
owned them), the post-transfer appreciation on the stock and earnings
on the securities created the $230,000 balance of the overall tax
savings.
The value of excluding post-transfer earnings from the transfer tax
base can be readily determined. It was stated earlier that K was able
to shift $160,000 of the security income earnings to her children. Ap-
plied to the fifty percent marginal tax rate, this produces a $80,000 tax
saving. The savings from the post-transfer appreciation on the stock
should therefore be the remaining $150,000 (the $230,000 balance mi-
nus $80,000 attributable to post-transfer earnings excluded from the
tax base). To verify this figure all one need do is compute the post-
transfer appreciation attributable to the transfer of the stock and mul-
tiply the result by the fifty percent marginal tax rate. K gifted away
$300,000 worth of her stock holdings. The holdings doubled in value.
Therefore, she had to include only $200,000 in her gross and taxable
estates instead of $800,000. The $600,000 difference is allocated
$300,000 to the value of the gift itself (already noted as not producing a
benefit) and $300,000 to the appreciation. The tax value of excluding
$300,000 as post-transfer appreciation from transfer taxation in a fifty
percent marginal tax bracket is, of course, $150,000. Voila! The total
$280,000 tax saving resulting from gift giving is equal to the sum of its
separately identifiable parts ($50,000 + $80,000 + $150,000).
The numbers in the hypotheticals bear consideration. The estate
tax reduced J's estate by almost $2,000,000; and even though K saved
over $250,000 by making gifts, her estate still suffered a tax shrinkage
in excess of $1,500,000. The magnitude of these numbers forces one to
step back and take notice.
As K's heirs discovered, despite substantial gifts in a relatively
short time period (a total of almost $750,000 in five years, which at the
time of her death was effectively worth $1,125,000) the government
"inherited" approximately thirty-five percent of of K's wealth. In J's
case, the government obliged itself to a forty-one percent share of the
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overall value transferred. The percentages and gross numbers are
eye-opening. Even if K had more time to make gifts and had increased
the amounts, there was only so much she could have done. By leaving
their entire estates to their spouses, the husbands of J and K helped
create a most unsatisfactory situation. Their failure to make use of
the unified credit needlessly cost their children $300,000.250 Also, by
leaving all of their property to their surviving spouses, they stacked all
of the values into one estate forcing the ultimate tax accounting at the
highest marginal tax rate possible.
Had the husband's of J and K pursued a prudent gift program, they
could have ameliorated the harsh tax consequences of the "stacking"
problem without impairing the welfare of their surviving spouses.
Even this approach is limited. At sufficiently high asset value levels
there is little that can be done to reduce the absolute tax liability. In
these situations gifts take on a different but equally important role.
As a taxpayer's wealth reaches beyond the fifty percent marginal tax
bracket, the gifts serve primarily to prevent increased taxes on future
growth and earnings rather than to actually reduce asset value owner-
ship for the purpose of eventually being taxed at a lower marginal
rate. The integrated nature of the transfer taxes prevent the latter
from happening either directly (by forcing a gift tax accounting itself
at the fifty percent level) or indirectly (by including all taxable gifts in
the tentative estate tax base). Once the taxpayer's wealth eclipses
$3,100,000 any subsequent increase in wealth will be taxed at fifty per-
cent regardless of whether it is taxed as a gift or as a part of the taxa-
ble estate. For these individuals gifts become the chief means of
avoiding the needless stacking of wealth in one's own estate which, as
previously demonstrated, is a role for which it is well suited. In these
higher value ranges, gifts still have a share of center stage in the estate
planning theater.
V. CONCLUSION
After wading through the sea of numbers, it becomes clear that
gifts are capable of providing tax benefits. Future income tax liabili-
ties can be reduced by shifting post-transfer income and unrealized
appreciation over to donees. Although the potential income tax bene-
fits may not in themselves be sufficient incentive to prompt a gift,
even after the recent rate reductions, the benefits point the way for
maximizing any available advantage. Beyond the gift-related scope of
the income tax field lies for some the more significant realm of the
transfer taxes. Despite substantial recent changes to the transfer
taxes, gifts continue to be viable tax reducing transactions. Conced-
250. The arithmetic is simple enough. The unified credit equivalent of $600,000 at the
highest marginal tax rate of 50 percent is $300,000.
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edly, under the current system most taxpayers are not subjected to
either gift or estate taxation; but for those who are, gifts play a crucial
role. When properly structured or incorporated in an aggressive pro-
gram, gifts prove to be more than up to the task of minimizing tax
exposure. The important role of gifts seems well entrenched in the
overall tax system as it presently exists, and subsequent changes to
rates and credits will serve only to limit the degree and number of
individuals who can avail themselves of their usefulness. 251 Gifts are
and will remain leading players in the estate planning theater and
should not be dismissed as being solely the concern of tax
archeologists.
251. If the much discussed "flat" tax replaced the current income tax, gifts would still
provide the means of moving the income tax accounting for post-transfer income
and unrealized appreciation to donees. The major difference under the flat tax
system would be that the actual tax savings would probably be less because of the
lower rates. Similarly, if the unified credit were to be increased, or the transfer
tax rates were further reduced, gifts would continue to provide the same benefits
they presently do. Again, the only difference would be in the fewer number of
taxpayers exposed to transfer taxation and the amount of the savings effected.
